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I. INTRODUCTION
A pandemic of sexual harassment has stricken the country. A recent Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) report shows that, depending 
on how the question is posed, between 25% and 85% of women respond that 
they have experienced harassment in the workplace.1 Even if the lower figure is 
accurate, the scope of the problem is shocking. It is equally troubling that 90% 
of incidents go unreported.2 Victims do not believe that their employers will be 
receptive to their complaints, and many fear censure or retaliation.3 These issues 
are not new.4 Sexual harassment has plagued American society for as long as 
power has provided a means to abuse the vulnerable.5 A heartbreaking example 
                                                                                                                     
1 EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF 
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: REPORT OF CO-CHAIRS CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA 
A. LIPNIC 8 (June 2016) [hereinafter EEOC REPORT]; see also Joann S. Lublin, When 
#MeToo at Work Becomes Catch-22, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/when-metoo-becomes-catch-22-1516798800 [https://perma.cc/D4L3-6UG2] 
(reporting the results of a December 2017 survey conducted by the American Management 
Association showing that 51% of female managers, executives, and professionals said they 
were the victims of sexual harassment in the workplace). 
2 EEOC REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
3 Id. at v.
4 See Mark Joseph Stern, Who’s to Blame for America’s Sexual Harassment 
Nightmare? The Supreme Court, for One, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/10/blame_the_supreme_court_for_america_
s_sexual_harassment_nightmare.html [https://perma.cc/CL5U-Q72X] (noting that, although 
sexual harassment has been illegal in the United States for fifty-three years, 75% of victims 
never report it); see also Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges filed with 
EEOC) FY 2010-FY 2017, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N [hereinafter EEOC 
Harassment Statistics] https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harass
ment_new.cfm [https://perma.cc/3FCS-KA8C] (reporting that for every year from 2010 to 
and including 2016 over 12,000 sex-based harassment charges were filed with the EEOC, 
and that in each of these years the EEOC found that over half of these complaints lacked 
reasonable cause).
5 See, e.g., Margaret Gardiner, Why Women Don’t Report Sexual Harassment,
HUFFPOST: THE BLOG (July 22, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Margaret-gardiner/
why-women-don’t-report-sex_b_11112996.html [https://perma.cc/5L9U-6CLH] (reporting 
that women, afraid of retaliation, regard harassment as the price for advancement in male-
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is Dr. Larry Nassar’s molestation of female gymnasts.6 Separated from their 
families, these young Olympic hopefuls were defenseless.7
Nearly every day, media reports denounce yet another name that only a short 
time ago was the object of admiration.8 The #MeToo movement has intensified 
the call for retribution against rogue personalities.9 Harvey Weinstein’s coercion 
of women into gratifying his lurid appetite awakened the public to the virulence 
of sexual harassment.10 For decades he avoided accountability by threatening to 
destroy careers and buying silence with hefty payoffs.11 And the parade of 
scoundrels marches on. Charges of sexual abuse levelled against Matt Lauer, 
the longtime star of the Today show, led NBC News to fire him.12 Facing a 
                                                                                                                     
dominated professions); Elizabeth Kristen et al., Workplace Violence and Harassment of 
Low-Wage Workers, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 169, 174–77 (2015) (discussing the 
susceptibility of restaurant and agricultural workers to sexual harassment).
6 See, e.g., Christine Hauser, McKayla Maroney, Describing Sexual Abuse, Calls 
Larry Nassar a ‘Monster of a Human Being,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/01/18/sports/mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar.html [on file with Ohio State 
Law Journal] (reporting Maroney’s accusation that Larry Nassar, former doctor for the 
women’s Olympic gymnastics team, molested her for years, beginning when she was 
thirteen, and citing similar charges raised by Olympians, Aly Raisman, Gabby Douglas, and 
Simon Biles).
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., Jill Filipovic, The Men Who Cost Clinton the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/opinion/matt-lauer-hillary-clinton.html [on file 
with Ohio State Law Journal] (listing Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, and Mark Halperin as 
journalists fired for sexually harassing women colleagues, denouncing President Trump for 
bragging about sexually abusive behavior, and criticizing Geraldo Rivera for minimizing the 
seriousness of sexual aggression against women).
9 Jessica Bennett, The #MeToo Moment: When the Blinders Come Off, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2017), http://.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/the-metoo-moment.html 
[https://perma.cc/R88S-RT25] (reporting that Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Mark Halperin, 
Leon Wieseltier, and Garrison Keillor all stand accused of sexual harassment or assault, and 
that the #MeToo movement has resulted in an explosion of reports of sexual harassment). 
But see Anna Graham Hunter, I Publicly Accused Dustin Hoffman of Harassment. Take It 
from Me, It’s Not Easy to Expose Sexual Misconduct, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), 
http://latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hunter-dustin-hoffman-standards-20171214-story.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/Y8Y9-52XA] (noting that some believe the #MeToo movement has 
become a witch hunt but adding that many victims fear that, if they report harassment, they 
will encounter blame).
10 See, e.g., Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid off Sexual 
Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/20
17/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal] (detailing Harvey Weinstein’s decades-long pattern of harassing women in the 
entertainment industry).
11 Id. (pointing out that Weinstein discouraged complaints by threatening victims with 
reprisals that might injure their business reputations and that he and other harassers, 
including Bill O’Reilly and Roger Ailes, silenced victims with hefty settlements).
12 See, e.g., John Koblin, After Firing Matt Lauer, NBC Executives Move to Control the 
Damage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), http://nytimes.com/2017/12/01/business/media/matt-
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similar public relations crisis, CBS, PBS, and Bloomberg TV ousted renowned
TV host, Charlie Rose, after eight women accused him of prancing naked in 
front of them and groping their breasts and genitals.13
Political figures, including former Congressman John Conyers,14 former 
Senator Al Franken,15 and failed senatorial candidate Roy Moore stand front 
and center among the lineup of offenders.16 Even a prominent jurist, Judge Alex 
Kozinski, formerly of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, was forced to resign 
for engaging in a pattern of sexual misconduct, including allegedly showing 
pornography to a law clerk and asking whether it aroused her.17 But the most 
alarming revelations have impugned the integrity of two Presidents. Bill Clinton 
proved a disgrace to the office when Paula Jones sued him for using his power 
as the Governor of Arkansas to lure her to a Little Rock hotel room where he 
exposed himself.18 And President Trump, during his candidacy, cast his name 
                                                                                                                     
lauer-firing-nbc-news.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (chronicling the response 
of NBC News to allegations that Matt Lauer sexually harassed women). 
13 See, e.g., Irin Carmon & Amy Brittain, Eight Women Say Charlie Rose Sexually 
Harassed Them—With Nudity, Groping and Lewd Calls, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), 
http://washingtonpost.com/investigations/eight-women-say-charlie-rose-sexually-harassed-
them-with-nudity-groping-and-lewd-call.html [https://perma.cc/W3TH-VFZV] (revealing 
that Rose’s accusers withheld exposing his wrongdoing for fear of retaliation and of his 
violent temper); John Koblin & Michael M. Grynbaum, Charlie Rose Fired by CBS and PBS 
After Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), http://nytimes.com/2017/11/21
/business/media/charlie-rose-fired-cbs.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]
(confirming that CBS and PBS discharged Charlie Rose because of allegations of “crude 
sexual advances”).
14 Yamiche Alcindor, John Conyers to Leave Congress Amid Harassment Claims, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/05//us/politics/jon-conyers-
election.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (reporting that Congressman Conyers 
resigned under intense pressure after reports of sexual harassment surfaced, including the 
charge of a woman who settled a harassment claim against him and said on television that 
he “repeatedly propositioned [a woman] for sex and asked her to touch his genitals,” and 
used taxpayer money to settle the sexual harassment claim of his former communications 
director). 
15 Carl Hulse, Al Franken’s Improbable Political Rise and Sudden Fall, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/politics/al-franken-resignation-
political-career.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (discussing the resignation of 
Senator Franken resulting from accusations that he fondled and acted in sexually 
inappropriate ways with women). 
16 Samantha Cooney, More Women Are Accusing Roy Moore of Sexual Misconduct. 
Here’s Everything You Need to Know About the Scandal, TIME (Nov. 17, 2017), 
http://time.com/5029172/roy-moore-accusers/ [https://perma.cc/QSQ2-E3WY] 
(summarizing allegations of molestation and other abuses committed against teenage girls).
17 Ruth Marcus, The Creepiest Sexual-Harassment Story We Aren’t Talking About,
WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-creepiest-
sexual-harassment-story-we-aren’t-talking-about.html [https://perma.cc/RXT3-8WN5] 
(exposing the abusive conduct of Judge Kozinski toward his female judicial clerk, a law 
student, a law professor, and a former judge).
18 See infra notes 187–202 and accompanying text (discussing Jones v. Clinton, 990 
F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998)). President Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky had 
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into disrepute when he bragged about groping women, a boast which numerous 
victims confirmed.19
The law is limited in its capacity to deter a pandemic that has psychological, 
sociological, and cultural causes.20 Nevertheless, the law has a role to play, 
particularly in the workplace. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits 
employment discrimination based on sex, and the courts have long recognized 
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.21 The Act has established a 
framework focused on conciliation and, where efforts at settlement fail, on 
litigation. Regrettably, this framework has failed to achieve its mission of 
deterrence.22
Part I of this Article examines sexual harassment law, concentrating on the 
principles prohibiting an employer from subjecting a worker to a hostile work 
environment. This Part begins with a discussion of Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson,23 in which the Supreme Court established the elements of such a claim. 
A plaintiff who alleges sexual harassment must prove that she was subjected to 
unwelcome, discriminatory words or conduct of a sexual or gender-related 
nature so severe or pervasive that they altered the conditions of her 
employment.24 Next, this Part analyzes Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc.,25 which clarified Meritor by stressing that the test for establishing a hostile 
work environment does not impose a “civility code” in the workplace.26 This 
                                                                                                                     
repercussions even more serious than the Paula Jones case. See, e.g., Associated Press, 
Gillibrand: Bill Clinton Should’ve Resigned over Affair with Monica Lewinsky, CHI. TRIB.
(Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld.poltics/ct-kirsten-
gillibrand-bill-clinton-20171116-story.html [https://perma.cc/4QSN-SNLL] (reporting 
Senator Gillibrand’s remarks suggesting that President Clinton should have resigned his 
office as a result of his affair with Monica Lewinsky). Charging President Clinton with 
perjury and obstruction of justice arising from his affair with Lewinsky, the House nearly 
ended his presidency by voting to impeach him. Id.
19 Ashley Parker et al., Three Women Reassert Allegations of Sexual Harassment 
Against President Trump, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
/politics/three-women-reassert-allegations-of-sexual-harassment-against-president-trump.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/KA7K-8R35] (noting that President Trump has dismissed the 
accusations and characterized reports of his misconduct as “Democrat-driven ‘fake news’”).
20 See EEOC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that the EEOC Select Task Force 
recognized that psychological, sociological, and cultural factors breed sexual harassment).
21 See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA.
L. REV. 1591, 1625 (2000) (noting that sexual harassment is a form of unlawful sex 
discrimination).
22 See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, License to Harass: Holding Defendants Accountable for 
Retaining Recidivist Harassers, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1059, 1071–73 (2008) (noting that the 
primary policy of Title VII is deterrence and arguing that providing a remedy to first-time 
victims of recidivist offenders would advance this policy).
23 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
24 Id. at 67–68.
25 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
26 Id. at 80.
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Part goes on to discuss Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,27 which announced that 
a plaintiff must establish that her work environment was both subjectively and 
objectively hostile.28
Meritor did not decide the circumstances under which an employer would 
be vicariously liable for the harassment of its supervisors. Burlington 
Industries., Inc. v. Ellerth,29 resolved this issue. Part I argues that Ellerth 
established a sensible framework that promoted deterrence. Finally, Part I 
examines Vance v. Ball State University,30 which undermined the Ellerth
framework by defining “supervisor” restrictively.31
Part II of this Article identifies the elements of a hostile work environment 
claim, and then, for each element, highlights federal court decisions that have 
rejected claims alleging highly offensive and even egregious misconduct. Based 
on these decisions, Part II argues that numerous federal court decisions have 
impeded the deterrent effect of sexual harassment law.
Part III observes that several reasons account for the failure of current law 
to curtail sexual harassment in the workplace. One of the primary reasons for 
this failure is the law’s focus on conciliation and litigation. Under the current 
model, complainants file grievances with the EEOC, which seeks to settle 
disputes. If settlement efforts fail, the EEOC may sue on a victim’s behalf or, 
more commonly, grant a victim the right to sue. Settling cases may do little to 
deter abuses. After entering into a settlement agreement, an employer may revert 
to complacency.32 Deterrence is similarly a secondary focus of the current 
litigation framework, which functions primarily as a means to compensate 
victims.33 To be entitled to monetary relief, a victim must have suffered injury.34
The injury requirement, in turn, calls for a demanding standard of liability. As 
noted, the current standard requires a plaintiff to establish severe or pervasive 
misconduct that objectively and subjectively renders the workplace hostile.35
Misconduct that is highly offensive but not severe or pervasive will escape 
accountability. Even worse, many lower courts have misapplied the existing 
standard, denying relief to employees subjected to outlandish offenses.36
To overcome these barriers to deterrence, Part III of this Article proposes 
that Congress supplement the current model of conciliation and litigation by 
granting the EEOC expanded enforcement powers. The EEOC should have
                                                                                                                     
27 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
28 Id. at 22.
29 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
30 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013).
31 Id. at 422.
32 See infra Part III.A (discussing the EEOC’s current procedural framework). 
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.4 (3d ed. 2008) (commenting that under Article III of the Constitution a plaintiff, to 
be entitled to relief, “must show a distinct and palpable injury to himself”).
35 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
36 See infra Part II.A. 
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plenary authority to initiate civil enforcement proceedings in both federal court 
on its own behalf and in quasi-judicial enforcement proceedings. Rather than 
compensating victims, the purpose of such proceedings would be to identify 
instances of workplace harassment and, where appropriate, sanction 
irresponsible employers with injunctions and fines. Because the EEOC, in such 
enforcement proceedings, would not seek relief on behalf of victims, the 
elements that establish injury would be superfluous. In such proceedings the 
EEOC should merely have to prove that discriminatory, sexual or gender-related 
words or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. By adopting 
the “highly offensive to a reasonable person” standard, Congress would 
maximize prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace.
This Article concludes with a request that Congress adopt these proposals.
In the alternative, this Article makes the same request of state legislatures.
Admittedly, implementing the proposals in this Article would not eliminate
sexual harassment. The problem is too tenacious and endemic to allow for an 
easy fix. But the approach advocated in this Article might curtail sexual 
harassment in the workplace. The imposition of sanctions, along with public 
exposure, might chasten reluctant employers to take forceful action.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIM
No federal statute expressly prohibits sexual harassment. Courts have 
implied this prohibition from Title VII, which makes it unlawful to discriminate 
because of sex.37 The courts have recognized two types of sexual harassment.38
Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a supervisor promises a subordinate 
benefits if she submits to his sexual advances or when he threatens retaliation if 
she does not submit.39 The more prevalent form of sexual harassment, hostile 
work environment, subjects a victim to intolerable work conditions.40
                                                                                                                     
37 See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1998) (noting that 
the text of Title VII does not mention the terms quid pro quo or hostile work environment, 
but that Title VII implicitly prohibits such forms of sexual harassment); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 
64 (holding that, under Title VII, sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex).
38 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62.
39 Compare Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751 (stating that quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs 
when threats are made and carried out), with Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (citing Bundy v. Jackson 641 F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (stating that quid pro 
quo harassment is conditioning employment benefits on the submission to sexual favors), 
and Lynn T. Dickinson, Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment: A New Standard, 2 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 107, 107 (1995) (stating that quid pro quo harassment occurs when an 
employer or supervisor conditions an employee’s benefits on her submission to sexual 
advances). 
40 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62.
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A. The Advent of the Hostile Work Environment Claim
The Supreme Court prescribed the elements of a hostile work environment 
claim in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.41 Sidney Taylor, a manager at a branch 
of Meritor Savings Bank, hired Mechelle Vinson as a teller-trainee.42 Vinson’s
job performance led to promotions to teller, head teller, and finally assistant 
branch manager.43 After four years on the job, she informed the bank that she 
was going on sick leave for an indefinite period, which stretched into two 
months.44 The bank ultimately discharged her for excessive absence.45
Vinson commenced an action against Taylor and the bank for sexual 
harassment.46 She alleged that, shortly after her employment at the bank began, 
Taylor invited her to dinner and suggested that they go to a motel and have sex.47
Though she refused initially, she finally complied because she feared he might 
retaliate by firing her.48 She estimated that over the next three years she 
succumbed to Taylor’s sexual demands forty to fifty times.49 She also testified 
that Taylor fondled her in the workplace, followed her into the women’s room, 
exposed himself to her, and raped her.50 These abuses allegedly stopped when 
she informed Taylor that she had a boyfriend.51 Taylor denied all of Vinson’s
allegations of sexual misconduct, asserting that a business-related dispute 
spawned her accusations.52
The district court dismissed Vinson’s claim.53 The court ruled that, 
regardless of the truth of her charges against Taylor, Vinson had, by her own 
admission, had a consensual affair with him.54 The D.C. Circuit reversed and 
remanded, believing that the district court had placed undue emphasis on
                                                                                                                     
41 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; see, e.g., Sasha Anderson, Note, That’s What He Said: The 
Office, (Homo)Sexual Harassment, and Falling Through the Cracks of Title VII, 47 ARIZ.
ST. L. REV. 961, 965–66 (2015) (characterizing Meritor as a milestone in the development 
of sexual harassment law).
42 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59.
43 Id. at 59–60.








52 Id. at 61.
53 Id.
54 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61. A finding of consent would not have diminished Vinson’s 
allegation that Taylor raped her. See id. at 68 (explaining that voluntary sexual conduct, if 
nevertheless unwelcome, constitutes sexual harassment).
2018] STRONG MEDICINE 1065
voluntariness when the controlling issue was whether Taylor had made Vinson’s
assent to his advances a condition of her employment.55
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the bank conceded that when a supervisor 
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s gender, the harassment 
violates Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination.56 Nevertheless, the 
bank denied liability, arguing that by forbidding discrimination in the 
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment, the statute 
proscribed activities resulting in economic rather than mere psychological 
harm.57 The Supreme Court disagreed, construing Title VII’s broad statutory 
language to encompass a spectrum of activities, even some without economic 
consequences.58
Addressing the issue of consent, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
unwelcome sexual advances lay at the core of a sexual harassment claim.59 The 
Court endorsed the view of the D.C. Circuit that Vinson’s fear of retaliation 
from Taylor may have induced her consent to his unwelcome advances.60 The 
Court also held that a claim of sexual harassment must pass a rigorous threshold.
To constitute actionable harassment, conduct must be “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive” to alter the conditions of the victim’s work environment.61
The final issue in the case was whether the bank would be vicariously liable 
if Taylor sexually harassed Vinson. The district court held that the bank would 
not be liable for Taylor’s harassment because it had no notice of the 
wrongdoing.62 The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the lower court, holding that an 
                                                                                                                     
55 Id. at 62. In its analysis, the D.C. Circuit stated that there are two types of sexual 
harassment. Id. The first, often referred to as quid pro quo, occurs when the harasser 
conditions employment benefits on sexual favors, and the second occurs when the 
harassment creates a hostile work environment. Id. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court modified 
the definition of quid pro quo harassment as workplace threats that the harasser carries out. 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753–54 (1998).
56 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
57 Id.
58 Id. Noting that EEOC Guidelines, though not binding, are persuasive authority, the 
Court relied on the agency’s view that economic injury is not required to establish a violation 
of Title VII. Id. at 65. The Court also cited circuit court decisions that upheld both sex and 
race harassment claims, though the plaintiffs alleged no economic loss. Id. at 65–66. 
59 Id. at 68.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 67.
62 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. In Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 
(1998), the Court answered the question of employer vicarious liability for a supervisor’s 
sexual harassment of a subordinate. See infra notes 110–124 and accompanying text 
(discussing when an employer is strictly liable and when it may establish an affirmative 
defense). The Court reasoned that employers delegate authority to supervisors who wield 
that authority over subordinates. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759–60. Aided by their agency powers, 
supervisors may alter their subordinates’ working conditions. Id. at 761–62. When a 
supervisor, aided by his agency powers, takes a tangible job action against his subordinate, 
the employer, having empowered the supervisor, is strictly liable. Id. at 762–63. A tangible 
job action is a significant change in the subordinate’s working conditions. Id. at 761–62. 
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employer is strictly liable for the harassment of a supervisor.63 The Supreme 
Court, while remarking that agency principles would determine the outcome of 
that issue, found the factual record undeveloped on the basic question of whether 
Taylor had sexually harassed Vinson.64 The Court therefore found the issue of 
the bank’s vicarious liability premature for decision.65
Meritor established a high threshold for sexual harassment claims. Such a 
standard of liability is appropriate in litigation where plaintiffs must establish 
injury to trigger entitlement to compensation. Later Supreme Court decisions 
built on this standard. 
B. Same-Sex Harassment and the “Code of Civility”
In Oncale v. Sundowners Offshore Services, Inc. the Court addressed 
concerns that the law of sexual harassment should not impose liability for minor 
transgressions.66 A member of an eight-man crew, Oncale worked as a 
roustabout on an oil platform operated by Sundowner.67 On several occasions 
other members of the crew subjected Oncale to unwelcome sex-related conduct, 
which included physical assault and the threat of rape.68 When Oncale 
complained that other personnel were abusing him, his supervisors took no 
remedial action.69 To avoid violent confrontations, Oncale quit his job.70
The principle issue in Oncale was whether Title VII’s protections against 
sexual harassment applied only to the male harassment of females—which was 
the primary focus of Title VII—or whether those protections applied to same-
sex harassment.71 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia interpreted the 
statute expansively, concluding that Title VII protected both men and women.72
He cited precedent recognizing that someone may discriminate against members 
                                                                                                                     
Examples of tangible job actions are refusal to hire, demotion, discharge from employment, 
denial of a raise, or reassignment to a position of diminished responsibility. Id. at 761. If a 
supervisor has not taken a tangible job action, the employer may seek to establish an 
affirmative defense, which has two elements: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Id. at 765. See Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (adopting the liability standard and 
affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth); Curtis J. Bankers, Note, Identifying Employers’ 
“Proxies” in Sexual-Harassment Litigation, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1785, 1808 (2014) (noting that 
Meritor rejected a strict-liability standard for employers).
63 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69–70.
64 Id. at 72. 
65 Id.
66 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).




71 Id. at 76.
72 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78.
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of his own race.73 The same logic, he reasoned, applied to sexual harassment 
law.74 Conceding that male against female harassment was the primary concern 
of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination, he noted that remedial statutes 
often redress wrongs beyond the targeted evil.75 To support his view that Title 
VII was such a statute, Justice Scalia quoted the broad statutory language, which 
condemns sex discrimination categorically.76
After adopting this generous and undoubtedly correct interpretation of Title 
VII, Justice Scalia addressed respondents’ concern that the statute, if construed 
too broadly, might devolve “into a general civility code for the American 
workplace.”77 To dispel this concern, Justice Scalia observed that a finding of 
unlawful sexual harassment requires a showing of differential treatment of 
someone in a protected class.78 Second, he pointed out that, far from merely 
proving a stray remark or two, a claimant must show that the offensive conduct 
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to render the work environment hostile.79
C. The Subjective and Objective Tests
As noted, Meritor held that a valid claim of sexual harassment does not 
require economic injury.80 One might argue therefore that at the very least a 
plaintiff should have to prove psychological injury. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 
Inc.81 resolved this issue. Teresa Harris was a manager for Forklift Systems, an 
equipment rental company.82 Charles Hardy, the company’s president, 
subjected Harris to a continuing pattern of harassment.83 On several occasions 
he told Harris, in the presence of other employees, “You’re a woman, what do 
you know,” “We need a man as a rental manager,” and you are a “dumb ass 
woman.”84 Hardy sometimes asked Harris to remove coins from his pants 
                                                                                                                     
73 Id. (citing Castanada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
74 Id. at 79.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 80.
77 Id.; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (commenting 
that the standards for establishing a hostile environment case “are sufficiently demanding to 
ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code,’” and citing occasional sex-
related joking, or teasing as not arising to the level of actionable harassment (quoting Oncale,
523 U.S. at 80)).
78 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81.
79 Id. at 81.
80 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
81 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
82 Id. at 19.
83 Id.
84 Id. These comments do not appear to reflect a motive of sexual desire, but rather 
indicate a discriminatory bias based on Harris’s gender. See infra note 273 and 
accompanying text (noting that a hostile work environment claim may stand on non-sexually 
motivated gender-based remarks). 
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pockets.85 He threw objects on the floor and asked Harris to pick them up, and 
he made sexual innuendos commenting on Harris’s clothing.86 After Harris 
complained to Hardy, he apologized, but he soon resumed his offensive 
behavior.87 While Harris was working with a customer, Hardy, in front of other 
employees, asked Harris if she had promised to have sex with the customer.88
This incident prompted Harris to quit.89
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a victim of sexual 
harassment must prove psychological injury to state a claim.90 Noting that a 
valid claim must rest on misconduct that creates a hostile work environment,91
Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that “Title VII comes 
into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.”92 A valid 
claim, however, must allege both objective and subjective alteration of the work 
environment.93 Justice O’Connor thus explained that an actionable claim under 
Title VII requires that “the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is 
perceived” as hostile.94
D. The Elements of a Hostile Work Environment Claim
Meritor established the elements of a hostile work environment claim. A 
plaintiff must show that (1) sexual words or conduct were (2) discriminatory, 
(3) unwelcome, (4) severe or pervasive, and (5) altered the conditions of the 
work environment.95 Harris implied that gender-related words or conduct, even 
if not expressing sexual desire, met the first element.96 Harris further instructed 
that both the defendant and a reasonable person must perceive that the work 
environment has become hostile.97 Taken together, these cases provide a 
sensible framework for what constitutes a hostile work environment that would 
entitle a plaintiff to monetary relief. The requirements of such a claim are not 
under-inclusive. They would seem to include most, if not all, plaintiffs who, 
because of experiencing abusive work conditions, deserve compensation. 
Neither is this standard over-inclusive. As Oncale emphasizes, this standard 
does not create a code of civility where a stray remark, joke, or inappropriate 
act, though offensive to the sensibilities of a reasonable person, would support 
                                                                                                                     





90 Id. at 20.
91 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
92 Id. at 22.
93 Id.
94 Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
95 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67–68.
96 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
97 Id. at 21–22.
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a federal lawsuit.98 Such minor offenses do not justify the costs of protracted 
litigation, the expenditure of judicial resources, or the imposition of monetary 
relief.
E. The “Aided by the Agency” Standard and the Affirmative Defense
Although Meritor set forth the elements of a hostile work environment 
claim, it left open the question of employer liability for the harassment of 
supervisors.99 The Supreme Court answered this question in Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.100
1. A Sensible Standard for Deterrence
Ellerth was a salesperson working for Burlington.101 Slowik, a midlevel 
supervisor with authority over Ellerth,102 barraged her with harassing 
misconduct.103 For example, while on a business trip with Ellerth, Slowik made 
remarks about her breasts, and when she balked at encouraging him, Slowik 
warned, “I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington.”104
Months later, Slowik expressed reservations for promoting Ellerth because she 
was not “loose enough,” and then Slowik rubbed her knees.105 Ellerth received 
the promotion, but when Slowik called her to convey the news, he told her that 
men in the business world “like women with pretty butts [and] legs.”106 Two 
months after that incident, when Ellerth asked Slowik for permission to add a 
customer’s logo to a sample, he refused to respond unless she told him what she 
was wearing, and days later when she renewed her request, he responded, “Are 
you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole 
heck of a lot easier.”107
                                                                                                                     
98 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998).
99 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
100 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998); see also Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (announcing the same holding reached in Ellerth).
101 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 747–48.
104 Id. at 748.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748. The Court noted that a trier of fact could find in Slowik’s 
remarks to Ellerth implicit threats of retaliation if she did not respond sexually to him. Id. at 
751. A threat when carried out, the Court explained, is referred to as quid pro quo harassment. 
Id. Other instances of harassment that are sufficiently severe or pervasive establish an 
actionable hostile work environment. Id. Although the lower courts had used the distinction 
between these two categories of harassment to assess employer liability, the Supreme Court 
stated that the distinction between quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment 
harassment is descriptive only, and does not lead to the legal analysis of employer 
responsibility for supervisor harassment of subordinate employees. Id.
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By expressly accepting the District Court’s finding that Slowik’s
misconduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work 
environment, the Supreme Court provided guidance as to how far harassing 
activity need go to cross the threshold of unlawfulness.108 As discussed below 
in Part III, many circuit court decisions have imposed a markedly higher 
threshold.109
The principal task before the Ellerth Court was to provide a standard of 
employer liability for harassment committed by supervisors.110 The Court 
reasoned that employers delegate authority to supervisors who wield that power 
over subordinates.111 Aided by their agency powers, supervisors may alter their 
subordinates’ work conditions.112 When supervisors, exercising these powers, 
take tangible employment actions against their subordinates, their employers are 
strictly liable.113 A tangible employment action is a significant change in a
subordinate’s work conditions, which usually inflicts economic harm.114
Employers are strictly liable because only supervisors have the delegated power 
to inflict such harm on subordinates.115 Examples are refusal to hire, demotion, 
discharge from employment, denial of a raise, and reassignment to a position of 
diminished pay or responsibility.116
                                                                                                                     
108 See id. at 754 (affirming District Court’s determination that Slowik’s conduct was 
sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute sexual harassment).
109 See infra Part III.A (discussing cases that have imposed unreasonably high thresholds 
for establishing severe or pervasive misconduct sufficient to constitute a violation of Title 
VII).
110 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (“We must decide, then, whether an employer has vicarious
liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work environment by making explicit threats to 
alter a subordinate’s terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill 
the threat.”).
111 See id. at 759–60 (indicating that the Restatement’s aided-by-the-agency rule, rather 
than the apparent authority rule, is applicable).
112 Id. at 761–62. To arrive at this standard, the Court recognized that a supervisor’s acts 
of sex discrimination may not advance the interests of his employer. Id. at 756–57. It would 
therefore make no sense to say that such a supervisor, when committing the harassment, was 
acting within the scope of his employment. Id. at 757. The Court, therefore, turned to section 
219(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which provides when an employer is liable 
for the wrongdoing of an employee even when the employee did not act within the scope of 
his employment. Id. at 758. Subsection 2 makes an employer liable for the torts of his 
employee when the employee “was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the 
agency relation.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (AM. LAW
INST. 1957)).
113 Id. at 762–63. But see Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold 
Employers Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based 
on Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 594–95 (2006) (arguing that employers 
should be strictly liable when a supervisor threatens retaliation if she does not submit to his 
sexual advances, and employer liability should not depend on whether the supervisor took a 
tangible employment action). 
114 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 761.
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If a supervisor has not taken a tangible employment action, the employer 
may seek to establish an affirmative defense, which has two elements: “(a) that 
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”117
The Court emphasized that, by including an affirmative defense, this 
framework promised to deter supervisors from committing sexual 
harassment.118 The Court reasoned, “To the extent limiting employer liability 
could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes 
severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose.”119
Some champions of employee rights argue that Ellerth should have imposed 
strict liability on employers for all harassment committed by supervisors.120
This criticism is misplaced. Ellerth established a standard for employer liability 
that promoted deterrence. Strict liability would lessen an employer’s incentive 
to adopt remedial measures, or to enforce such measures once adopted. The first 
                                                                                                                     
117 Id. at 765; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) 
(adopting the liability standard and affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth). Joined by Justice 
Scalia, Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority’s holding insofar as it established the 
affirmative defense to harassment not involving a tangible job action. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
769–70 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He analogized sexual harassment cases to racial harassment 
cases and pointed out that in racial harassment cases, an employer is liable for the harassment 
of a supervisor only if the employer was negligent, that is, if the employer knew or should 
have known of the harassing activities and took no remedial action. Id. at 767–68 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). But see Brian J. Baldrate, Note, Agency Law and the Supreme Court’s 
Compromise on “Hostile Environment” Sexual Harassment in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1149, 1178 (1999) (criticizing 
Ellerth and Faragher for creating confusion, and proposing that Congress establish a single 
strict liability or negligence standard that would apply to all sexual harassment cases).
118 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. But see Daniel J. Harmelink, Note, Employer Sexual 
Harassment Policies: The Forgotten Key to the Prevention of Supervisor Hostile 
Environment Harassment, 84 IOWA L. REV. 561, 601 (1999) (proposing that, to deter sexual 
harassment effectively, an employer’s liability in hostile work environment cases depend 
entirely on whether the employer has adopted, communicated, and vigorously enforced a 
sexual harassment policy). 
119 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. But see Evan D. White, Note, A Hostile Environment: How 
the “Severe or Pervasive” Requirement and the Employer’s Affirmative Defense Trap Sexual 
Harassment Plaintiffs in a Catch-22, 47 B.C. L. REV. 853, 860 (2006) (arguing that victims 
of sexual harassment face a dilemma because, if they report harassment to their employer 
immediately on its occurrence, the harassment may not meet the “severe or pervasive” 
requirement, but if they delay until the harassment has grown in severity or pervasiveness, 
they may not meet the reporting requirement of the affirmative defense).
120 See, e.g., Timothy Broderick & Katrina Saleen, A Victim’s Guide to Sexual 
Harassment, SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAWYERS: BLOG http://www.sexualharassmentlawyers
paloalto.com/online-e-book/chapter-five-employer-and-individual-responsibilities 
[https://perma.cc/TP2K-FDDT] (noting that under California’s Fair Employment and 
Housing Law, employers are strictly liable for supervisor harassment, regardless of whether 
the supervisor took a tangible employment action against the victim).
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prong of the affirmative defense encourages employers to implement, 
communicate, and enforce sexual harassment policies.121 The second prong also 
supports deterrence by encouraging victimized employees to report
harassment.122 Unfortunately, in Vance v. Ball State University,123 a racial 
harassment case, the Supreme Court undercut this framework by narrowly 
defining “supervisor.”124
2. Curtailment of the Ellerth Standard
Vance, an African American woman, worked as a catering assistant for Ball 
State University (BSU).125 She filed suit against BSU, alleging that Saundra 
Davis, a white employee of BSU, had racially harassed her.126 The key to 
Vance’s claim was that Davis was her “supervisor,” and, therefore, that BSU 
was vicariously liable under Ellerth.127 The District Court and Seventh Circuit 
disagreed.128 They both held that a “supervisor,” by definition, has the authority 
to take tangible employment actions against a subordinate, and, because Davis 
did not have that degree of authority over Vance, Davis was not her 
supervisor.129 Holding that Davis was merely a co-employee of Vance, both 
courts ruled that Vance could recover from BSU only if she could prove BSU 
                                                                                                                     
121 But see Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back: A Retrospective on 
Sexual Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1047 (2015) (lamenting that anti-harassment 
workplace policies and procedures have proliferated without any inquiry into their deterrent 
effectiveness).
122 In Pa. State Police v. Suders, the Supreme Court extended the Ellerth holding to 
cases of constructive discharge. 524 U.S. 129, 134 (2004). First the Court defined 
constructive discharge. Id. Such a discharge occurs when working conditions are so 
intolerable that an employee’s reasonable response may be to resign. Id. Next, the Court 
ruled that constructive discharge, in itself, is not necessarily a tangible job action. Id. at 140–
41. Only when a supervisor is aided by his agency powers in instigating the resignation will 
construction discharge impel the imposition of strict liability against the employer. Id. at 144. 
Otherwise, the Ellerth affirmative defense will be available to the employer who will bear 
the burden of proof to establish the two prongs of that defense. Id. at 148–49. Because Suders
declined to classify constructive discharge as a tangible job action which would necessitate 
employer strict liability, one might characterize this decision as a victory for employers. The 
same counterargument, however, applies here as applied in Ellerth. Suders promotes the 
deterrence policy of Title VII by encouraging victims to report harassment and incentivizing 
employers to respond with corrective measures. Intolerable working conditions do not 
emerge suddenly. Such conditions build up over a period of time. It is during this period that 
Suders prompts the employee and the employer to take action.
123 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013).
124 Id. at 424.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 424–25.
127 Id. at 425. Before commencing the lawsuit, Vance had complained internally and 
then to the EEOC, as required by law. Id. She alleged that Davis glared at her, slammed pots 
and pans in her presence, and blocked her in an elevator. Id.
128 Id. at 425–26.
129 Vance, 570 U.S. at 426.
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negligent.130 Because BSU had responded reasonably to Vance’s complaints 
against Davis, Vance could not prove negligence, and accordingly the District 
Court granted BSU summary judgment, a decision which the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed.131
The Supreme Court had to choose between two competing definitions of 
“supervisor.”132 The more inclusive view defined a “supervisor” as someone 
having the authority to exercise significant control over a subordinate’s work 
conditions.133 The more restrictive view, adopted by the Seventh Circuit, 
defined a “supervisor” as someone having the authority to take a tangible 
employment action against a subordinate.134 The Supreme Court endorsed the 
restrictive formulation.135 To justify its holding, the Court raised a practical 
point. Defining “supervisor” as one with the authority to take tangible 
employment actions established a clear cut standard, which lower courts and 
juries could easily apply.136 The alternative definition—having the authority to 
direct the job activities of a co-worker—was so vague that it would frustrate 
judges and confuse jurors.137 To illustrate the ambiguity of the alternative 
definition, the Court noted that, depending on the task at hand, employers 
sometimes alternate the authority to direct work activities from one member of 
a team to another.138
The Court suggested that Ellerth supported its view that all supervisors 
have, by definition, authority to take tangible employment actions against 
subordinates.139 The Court gleaned this meaning from Ellerth’s assertion that 
only supervisors have such power.140 But the Vance Court’s reasoning was 
flawed. Though it may be true that only supervisors have such authority, it does 
not follow that such authority is vested in all supervisors. In other words, 
supervisors with the authority to take tangible employment actions may be a 
subset of all supervisors.141
                                                                                                                     
130 Id.
131 Id. The dissent noted that the prevailing negligence standard, which applies when an 
employee charges a co-employee with workplace harassment, requires that the employer 
knew or should have known of the harassing activity but failed to take remedial action. Id. 
at 453–54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 430–31 (majority opinion).
133 Id. at 431. The EEOC adopted this position in an Enforcement Guidance. Id.
134 Id. at 430–31.
135 Vance, 570 U.S. at 431.
136 Id. at 432.
137 Id. Seeking guidance to define “supervisor,” the Court quoted prominent dictionaries 
but found both definitions acceptable. Id. at 432–33. The Court similarly found that both 
definitions were used in legal contexts. Id. at 433–34. 
138 Id. at 446. 
139 Id. at 440.
140 Id.
141 See Vance, 570 U.S. at 439, 441–42 (acknowledging that one might characterize 
those supervisors with authority to take tangible job actions against subordinates as a subset 
of all supervisors).
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Justice Ginsburg dissented.142 She argued cogently that the majority’s view 
undermined one of the primary policies of Title VII: to deter workplace 
discrimination.143 If previous incidents of harassment have gone unreported, she 
argued, an employer might have no reason to know about the harassment, and 
therefore, under the negligence standard, which would apply under the 
majority’s view, the employer might elude liability.144 If, on the other hand, the 
law adopted the more inclusive definition of “supervisor,” employers would 
face a greater potential of liability for harassment, and they would have a 
heightened incentive to implement preventative measures.145
Justice Ginsburg also controverted the majority’s argument that the more 
restrictive definition of supervisor is clearer than the more inclusive 
alternative.146 She argued that, under the majority’s view, a manager lacking 
authority to hire or fire but possessing the authority to reassign or discipline 
other employees might or might not qualify as a supervisor.147 Justice Ginsburg 
noted the majority’s failure to deal with another murky scenario.148 An 
employer, perhaps to evade liability, might authorize only a few managers to 
take tangible employment actions.149 In such cases, the few with such authority 
might rely on lower-level employees who, having interacted with co-workers, 
would be empowered to recommend actions such as demotion or discharge.150
                                                                                                                     
142 Id. at 451 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined 
in the dissent. Id. 
143 Id. In support of this argument, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the Court should 
have deferred to the EEOC, the agency with expertise in the area of employment 
discrimination. Id. at 463. The EEOC Guidance adopted the broad definition of supervisor. 
Id. at 451; see, e.g., LaDelle Davenport, Comment, Vance v. Ball State University and the 
Ill-Fitted Supervisor/Co-Worker Dichotomy of Employer Liability, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1431, 
1455 (2015) (preferring the Vance dissent’s definition of “supervisor,” and applying the label 
“superior” to managers with authority to direct the day-to-day activities of co-workers but 
without authority to take tangible employment actions against them).
144 Vance, 570 U.S. at 466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg strengthened her 
argument by pointing out that a plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish negligence, 
whereas the defendant has the burden of proof to establish the Ellerth affirmative defense. 
Id. at 46. See, e.g., Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Non-Employee Discrimination,
58 B.C. L. REV. 1169, 1193–94 (2017) (noting that employers are liable for the harassment 
of coworkers when the employer was negligent in failing to prevent the harassment). 
145 Vance, 570 U.S. at 468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Title VII—Employer Liability 
for Supervisor Harassment—Vance v. Ball State University, 127 HARV. L. REV. 398, 407 
(2013) (asserting that common law principles support the dissenters’ definition of 
supervisor).
146 Vance, 570 U.S. at 464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. (noting the problematic implications of the majority’s decision).
150 See id. The majority responded to this criticism, suggesting that, when employers use 
this strategy to insulate themselves from liability, the few managers with the power to take 
tangible employment actions will, of necessity, rely on recommendations of lower-level 
employees who interact with co-employees. Id. at 446–47 (majority opinion). Because the 
employer has delegated supervisory authority to such lower level employees, they will be 
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Under the majority’s definition, the power to recommend and influence but not
to enforce tangible employment actions might or might not establish the status 
of “supervisor.”151
Finally, Justice Ginsburg argued that Faragher implicitly resolved the issue 
by adopting the broad definition of a supervisor.152 She pointed out that nothing 
in the record of Faragher suggested that Silverman, one of the harassers, had 
authority to take tangible employment actions against Faragher, the victim of 
the harassment.153 Yet the Court characterized Silverman as Faragher’s
supervisor, and held the employer, Boca Raton, vicariously liable for 
Silverman’s harassment.154 Though intuitively appealing, this point carries little 
weight because it is based neither on the holding nor even on any dictum in 
Faragher. Justice Ginsburg’s most salient argument, as noted above, was based 
on policy: the more inclusive definition of supervisor incentivizes employers to 
prevent harassment and encourages victims to report it.
3. The Ellerth/Vance Framework
Ellerth mapped out a workable framework for employer liability for sexual 
harassment. When employers delegate power to supervisors who exercise those 
powers to inflict substantial harm on subordinates, the employers have 
facilitated the supervisors’ abuse of power. The imposition of strict liability on 
employers is therefore appropriate. In all other circumstances, the two-prong 
affirmative defense encourages employers to take preventative and corrective 
measures and encourages victims to report the harassment internally. It is 
regrettable that Vance removed a significant subset of those with supervisory 
                                                                                                                     
deemed supervisors. Id.; see also Daniel Leigh, Note, The Cat’s Paw Supervisor: Vance v. 
Ball State University’s Flexible Jurisprudence, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 1053, 1071 (2015) 
(noting that the majority’s definition of supervisor includes those whose authority is 
effectively, though informally, delegated, and observing that this circumstance would 
impose “cat’s paw” liability on the employer).
151 Vance, 570 U.S. at 464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also pointed out 
that, even were the majority correct in its assertion that its definition provides clarity, seeking 
mechanical precision is not, in any event, desirable. Id. at 465. The workplace is dynamic, 
and the roles played by employees are too complex to fall into simplistic categories, and thus 
a subtle analysis is required. Id. For example, under the majority’s definition, Justice 
Ginsburg asked, would a pitching coach qualify as a supervisor of pitchers on his team, or 
would a law-firm associate qualify as the supervisor of a paralegal working for the firm? See 
id.; see, e.g., Andrew Freeman, Comment, A Bright Line, but Where Exactly? Closer Look 
at Vance v. Ball State University and Supervisor Status Under Title VII, 19 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 1153, 1171 (2015) (arguing that the Vance majority did not sufficiently take into 
account non-hierarchical organizational structures where lines of who has the authority to 
hire, fire, and demote are not clearly drawn).
152 Vance, 570 U.S. at 456–57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 457 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780–81 (1998)).
154 Id. (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808–09). 
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authority from the definition of “supervisor” and thus unduly limited the 
deterrent effect of the affirmative defense.155
III. THE FAILURE OF THE LAW TO CONTROL THE PANDEMIC
The requirements for establishing hostile work environment are rigorous. 
The Supreme Court in Meritor, Harris, and Oncale fashioned this standard to 
limit actionable claims to those based on serious misconduct.156 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that numerous courts have dismissed cases where plaintiffs 
have alleged facts that, although troubling, fail to meet the threshold for 
liability.157 Even more disturbing, many federal courts have ignored the 
teaching of the triad of controlling Supreme Court decisions, applying a 
                                                                                                                     
155 See supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text.
156 See Oncale v. Sundowners Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (instructing 
that conduct “tinged with offensive sexual connotations” does not support a claim, but that 
an actionable claim requires conduct so severe or pervasive that it creates a hostile work 
environment) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
157 See, e.g., Blake v. MJ Optical, Inc., 870 F.3d 820, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2017) (affirming 
district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff did not formally 
complain that the business owner’s son frequently grabbed her buttocks and commented 
about her breasts); Stancombe v. New Process Steel LP, 652 F. App’x 729, 730–31 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants where the 
harasser grabbed the victim’s buttocks three times, and in a second incident thrust his pelvis 
into the victim’s face three times); Ponte v. Steelcase, Inc., 741 F.3d 310, 313–14 (1st Cir. 
2014) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant where male 
supervisor, on two separate occasions during training program, insisted on driving female
subordinate to hotel, rested his hand on her shoulder, and once told her to do “the right thing 
by him”); Clayton v. City of Atlantic City, 538 F. App’x 124, 125–26 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(affirming the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff’s 
supervisor in police department asked her out and, after she refused, grabbed her buttocks in 
public, made disparaging remarks to her, and retaliated against her by unfairly disciplining 
her and unfairly scheduling her vacations); Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 369–70 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (reversing a jury verdict for plaintiff where plaintiff proved at trial that a co-
employee taunted her with jokes about oral sex, likening carrots, bananas, and hot dogs to 
penises, and planted carrots and potatoes in her mailbox at work to simulate male genitalia); 
Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for defendants, and holding that three incidents of harassment, including 
placing a pack of cigarettes under plaintiff’s bra strap, saying to plaintiff that she had “lost 
[her] cherry,” and saying to plaintiff at Christmastime, “Dick the malls, dick the malls, I 
almost got aroused,” were insufficient to allege severe or pervasive behavior); Mendoza v. 
Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1241–43 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s grant of 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant where harasser (1) rubbed his hip against 
the victim while touching her shoulder and smiling, (2) on two occasions made a sniffing 
sound while looking at the victims crotch, and (3) constantly stared at the victim and 
followed her around the workplace in a stalking fashion); Park v. Pulsarlube USA, Inc., 209 
F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1037–38 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (granting defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment where co-worker (1) crowded plaintiff by sitting unreasonably close to her at 
lunch, (2) said he liked to be close to her, (3) showed her a picture of a nude woman on his 
iPad, and (4) attempted to touch her breasts).
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standard that condones behavior that should, by any reasonable measure, justify 
moral rebuke and legal liability.158 Such cases undermine Title VII’s policy of 
deterrence.159
                                                                                                                     
158 See, e.g., Graves v. Dayton Gastroenterology, Inc., 657 Fed. App’x 485, 486–87 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants where 
harasser twice sent sexually explicit texts to the victim and, after she reported the 
misconduct, retaliated against her by assigning her the most difficult tasks, denying her lunch 
breaks, and even throwing a chair at her); Velázquez-Pérez v. Developers Diversified Realty 
Corp., 753 F.3d 265, 267–69 (1st Cir. 2014) (affirming district court ruling that conduct was 
not severe or pervasive where female with some authority over male subordinate tried to 
force her way into his hotel room during company conference, sent him multiple sexually 
motivated emails, threatened to have him fired after he rebuffed her romantic advances, and 
influenced the decision to fire him); Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 325–
27 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of case where supervisor attempted to grab plaintiff 
in a truck, tried to kiss her on several occasions, kissed her once, and told her at a restaurant 
“to save the cherry because he had things he wanted to do to her with [it] later,” but excluding 
this evidence because employer reassigned plaintiff after she complained, though employer 
later reassigned harasser to be plaintiff’s supervisor and he resumed harassing activities); 
LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1099–1100 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant where harasser twice asked plaintiff to 
watch pornographic movies and “jerk [] [his] dick off,” and, on a third occasion forcibly 
kissed plaintiff, grabbed his buttocks and reached for his genitals); Bowman v. Shawnee 
State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 458–59 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming grant of summary judgment to 
defendants where, on three separate occasions, female supervisor touched male employee 
sexually, on one of those occasions grabbing his buttocks); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 
229 F.3d 917, 921, 927 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant 
where the harasser grabbed and fondled the plaintiff’s bare breast); Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 577–79 (11th Cir. 2000) (reversing jury verdict for plaintiff where a 
college professor subjected a newly hired colleague to a pattern of harassment, including (1) 
calling her repeatedly on the phone at night sometimes asking her if she was in bed and, in 
one instance, suggesting that they should have spent a night together, (2) putting his hand on
her inner thigh and raising the hem of her dress, these incidents occurring on two separate 
occasions in his office, (3) inviting her to his office where he had on an undershirt, unbuckled 
his trouser, and pulled down his zipper ostensibly to tuck in his dress shirt, and (4) telling 
her that women are like meat and that men need a variety of women).
159 See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). In Ellerth, the 
Supreme Court instructed:
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective 
grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer’s 
effort to create such procedures, it would effect Congress’ intention to promote 
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context. . . . To the extent limiting 
employer liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it 
becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose. 
Id. 
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A. Flagrantly Severe or Pervasive
Some lower courts have required plaintiffs to show flagrantly severe or 
pervasive misconduct.160 This requirement mirrors the standard for the 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, which requires conduct that is 
outrageous and uncivilized.161 The demanding threshold for liability in 
emotional distress cases may be appropriate to remove everyday complaints of 
minor offense from the courthouse, but rampant sexual harassment calls for a 
standard response to the plight of workers who do their jobs under intolerable 
conditions.
1. Multiple Incident Cases
Too many courts dissect a pattern of harassment, view the events of 
misconduct in isolation, and then decide that the harassment was neither severe 
nor pervasive. The courts reason like someone who disassembles a jigsaw 
puzzle, looks at each piece separately, and concludes that the puzzle makes no 
sense.
One striking case is LeGrand v. Area Resources for Community and Human 
Services.162 Area Resources for Community and Human Services (ARCHS), is 
a non-profit organization, devoted to revitalizing several communities in 
Missouri.163 As a facilitator employed by ARCHS, LeGrand worked with local 
residents and community leaders on improvement projects.164 Father Maurice 
Nutt was both a co-chair of ARCHS and a member of its board of directors.165
LeGrand alleged that, when he visited Father Nutt to provide him with an update 
on community development initiatives, Father Nutt asked LeGrand to view 
pornographic movies and “to jerk off with him.”166 LeGrand rejected Father 
                                                                                                                     
160 See infra Part III.A.1&2 (discussing cases where egregious misconduct did not incur 
liability).
161 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: “One who by extreme and outrageous 
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46(1) (AM.
LAW INST. 1965). “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous 
in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and 
to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. at cmt. D;
see L. Camille Hébert, Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Dignitary 
Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1345, 1354–55 (2014) (suggesting that in egregious hostile-work-
environment cases, the “severe-or-pervasive” element would meet the “outrageous and 
uncivilized conduct” element of a claim for the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
162 LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 
2005).
163 Id. at 1099.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1100.
166 Id.
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Nutt’s invitation.167 When LeGrand reported this incident to his supervisors at 
ARCHS, they advised him to document it.168 After LeGrand did so, they 
suggested that LeGrand seek counseling through ARCHS’s Employee 
Assistance Program.169 Again, LeGrand complied.170 Approximately six
months after the initial incident of harassment, LeGrand ran into Father Nutt at 
ARCHS’s offices.171 LeGrand stated that Father Nutt renewed his invitation to 
view pornographic movies and “jerk [] [Father Nutt’s] dick off.”172 Father Nutt 
then kissed LeGrand on the mouth, grabbed his buttocks, and reached for his 
genitals.173 In response, LeGrand pushed him away and cursed him.174 A final 
incident occurred one month later when Father Nutt gripped LeGrand’s thigh 
while they were seated at a table during an ARCHS meeting.175
LeGrand filed a sexual harassment charge with the EEOC.176 An EEOC 
investigation revealed that Father Nutt admitted hugging and kissing LeGrand 
and brushing LeGrand’s crotch, but he asserted that the kiss was mutual.177
After the investigation, ARCHS procured Father Nutt’s resignation from the 
board of directors.178 LeGrand then commenced an action against ARCHS in 
federal district court, alleging that he had endured a hostile work
environment.179 The court granted ARCHS’s motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that LeGrand had not alleged misconduct sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment claim.180
The Eighth Circuit stressed that, to be actionable, sexual misconduct must 
poison the work environment and permeate the workplace.181 By imposing this 
standard, the court disregarded the Supreme Court’s injunction that a valid 
harassment claimant, rather than having to allege a polluted work environment,
                                                                                                                     
167 Id.
168 LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1100.
169 Id.
170 Id. These incidents of harassment apparently had a profound impact on LeGrand. 
After filing a complaint with the EEOC, he sought counseling through ARCHS’s Employee 
Assistance Program five times over a six-month period. Id. He then went on medical leave 
from ARCHS. Id. During LeGrand’s leave, ARCHS, because of insufficient funding, 
eliminated all community facilitator positions, including LeGrand’s position. Id. Thereafter, 









178 Id. at 1100–01.
179 Id. at 1101.
180 LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1101.
181 See id. at 1101–02 (quoting Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 
1999)).
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had merely to show a hostile one.182 Comparing LeGrand’s allegations (and 
Father Nutt’s admissions) to previously decided cases, the Eighth Circuit,
though conceding that Father Nutt’s conduct was “crass,” “churlish,” and 
“manifestly inappropriate,” noted that the isolated incidents occurred over a 
nine month period and were neither severe nor pervasive.183
By characterizing the incidents as isolated rather than recurrent, the court 
played a neat rhetorical game. Rather than implying that a span of nine months 
mitigated the seriousness of the misconduct, the court could have observed that 
harassing conduct sustained over so long a period intensified its seriousness. 
Though the Eighth Circuit’s affirmation of summary judgment in favor of 
ARCHS was misguided, the court’s rationale is articulable.184 The law 
discourages the wave of harassment claims that might flood the courthouse if 
the standard for hostile work environment harassment devolved into a “civility
code for the American workplace.”185 The Eighth Circuit’s imposition of an 
unreasonably high standard for claims of hostile work environment highlights 
the need for a legal mechanism to punish the types of harassment alleged in 
LeGrand.
2. Single Incident Cases
The permissive version of the severe-or-pervasive standard has led many 
courts to grant employers summary judgment when a harassment claim rested 
on a single incident, even if that incident was “egregious” and, in some cases, 
even if the harassment involved physical assault.186
The most notorious of these cases is Jones v. Clinton.187 When Bill Clinton 
was Governor of Arkansas, he noticed Paula Jones, a government employee 
working at the registration desk at a conference at the Excelsior Hotel in Little 
                                                                                                                     
182 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (declaring that a plaintiff 
alleging sexual harassment need show only that the harassing conduct altered the conditions 
of the victim’s employment but not that the misconduct polluted the work environment). 
183 LeGrand, 394 F.3d at 1102–03.
184 Id.
185 Oncale v. Sundowners Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
186 See, e.g., Figueroa v. Johnson, 648 F. App’x 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that to 
support a claim of sexual harassment a single incident must be “extraordinarily severe”); 
Paul v. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., 309 F. App’x 825, 826, 828 (5th Cir. 2009) (requiring 
that, to be actionable, a single incident of sexual harassment be “egregious,” and affirming 
district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant where co-worker “chesting up” to 
victim’s breasts, and when she fled, followed her, forced his way through the door ahead of 
her, placed his hand on her stomach and around her waist, and rubbed his pelvis against her 
hips and buttocks); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 921, 922–27 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant where co-worker 
trapped the victim behind a console, twice forced his hand under her sweater, and twice 
grabbed and fondled her bare breasts).
187 Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
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Rock.188 Using a police officer, Danny Ferguson, as an intermediary, Clinton 
invited Jones to his hotel suite.189 Jones accepted, thinking the invitation an 
honor.190 After Jones arrived at Clinton’s suite and they had exchanged 
pleasantries, he took her hand and drew her toward him.191 When she retreated, 
Clinton approached her again and said, “I love your curves.”192 He then put his 
hand on her leg, slid it toward her pelvis, and tried to kiss her.193 Ignoring her 
attempts to rebuff him, the governor exposed and fondled his erect penis.194
Before she left the suite, the governor detained her briefly and warned her not 
to talk about the incident.195 Several witnesses, including Jones’s co-workers,
confirmed that the incident with Clinton upset Jones, and that she cried as a 
result of the harassment.196
The district court granted Clinton’s motion for summary judgment.197 The 
totality of circumstances, said the judge, did not show that the harassment was 
so severe or pervasive to subject Jones to a hostile work environment.198 The 
judge ticked off facts to illustrate the relatively minor scope of the impact that 
Clinton’s sexual improprieties had on Jones. Jones admitted that she never 
missed a day of work as a result of the harassment, she continued at her 
government job for nineteen months after the incident at the Excelsior Hotel, 
                                                                                                                     
188 Id. at 663.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 663–64.
192 Id. at 664.
193 Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 664–65. Jones asserted that one month later Officer Ferguson approached her 
and told her that the governor’s wife was out of town, that the Governor wanted Jones’s 
telephone number, and that he wanted to see Jones. Id. at 665. During that encounter, Officer 
Ferguson asked Jones about her fiancé Steve, a question which frightened her because she 
had never mentioned Steve to Ferguson or Governor Clinton. Id. Jones also encountered 
Ferguson when she returned to work from maternity leave. Id. At that time, he commented 
that he had told the Governor how good she looked after having a baby. Id. Finally, she 
alleged that Clinton accosted her in the rotunda of the Arkansas State Capitol, draped his 
arm over her, held her tightly, and remarked that they made a beautiful couple. Id. Despite 
these later incidents, the court focused primarily on the harassment that occurred in the 
Excelsior Hotel. Id. at 675.
197 Id. at 662.
198 Id. at 675. But see Moira McAndrew, How the Supreme Court’s Reiteration of Sexual 
Harassment Standards Affirmed in Faragher and Ellerth Would Have Led to Jones’ Survival 
in Jones v. Clinton, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 231, 243–44 (1999) (arguing that, though Jones’s 
case hinged on a single incident, prior and subsequent Supreme Court and circuit court
rulings imply that her case should have survived summary judgment).
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she never filed a formal complaint, and she never consulted a psychiatrist, 
psychologist, or other medical professional.199
It is hardly surprising that Jones did not file a complaint against the 
Governor, the man who wielded unfettered authority over the conditions of her 
employment and could have ordered her discharge at his whim. Furthermore, 
the Governor told her not to talk about the incident, a warning that amounted to 
an implicit threat. Nor should persevering at the job or foregoing counseling
count against her. As the Supreme Court aptly observed in Harris,200 to state a 
valid claim of sexual harassment, the victim need not demonstrate psychological 
harm,201 though Jones in fact alleged such harm. This decision seems blind to 
Harris’ instruction that, to have a claim, a victim does not have to suffer a 
“nervous breakdown.”202
One might surmise that in the Jones v. Clinton decision the President 
benefited from the prestige or influence of his high office. Though one cannot 
dismiss this possibility, in Brooks v. City of San Mateo, the harasser was neither 
a president nor even a governor.203 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, known for 
its liberal bent, subjected the victim of a single incident of harassment to the 
same harsh standard applied in Jones v. Clinton. Patricia Brook was a telephone 
dispatcher for the City of San Mateo.204 She and her supervisor, Steven 
Selvaggio, were on duty at the city communications center fielding 911 calls.205
Suddenly Selvaggio placed his hands on Brooks’s stomach and commented on 
her sexiness.206 She responded by pushing him away.207 Later, while Brooks 
was answering a call, Selvaggio boxed her in behind the communications 
console, forced his hand under her sweater, and fondled her bare breast.208
Brooks removed Selvaggio’s hand and told him he had “crossed the line” to 
which he responded, “you don’t have to worry about cheating [on your 
husband], I’ll do everything.”209 Selvaggio then moved to grab Brooks’ breast 
again, but another dispatcher entered the room at that moment.210 Selvaggio 
                                                                                                                     
199 Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 675. Approximately nineteen months after the incident in the 
Excelsior Hotel, Jones stopped working for the State of Arkansas to move to California with 
her husband who had been transferred there. Id.
200 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
201 Id. at 22 (“Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous 
breakdown.”).
202 Id.
203 Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2000).





209 Brooks, 229 F.3d at 921.
210 Id.
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backed off and soon left the communications center.211 Brooks immediately 
reported the incident.212
An investigation revealed that at least two other female workers had 
suffered similar treatment from Selvaggio.213 The city initiated termination 
proceedings against him which prompted his resignation.214 He pleaded no 
contest to a sexual assault charge and spent 120 days in jail.215
Brooks commenced an action against San Mateo, its police department, 
and police chief for hostile work environment.216 The district court granted 
summary judgment to the defendants.217 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that, to state a hostile-work-environment claim, a plaintiff must 
show “a workplace atmosphere so discriminatory and abusive that it 
unreasonably interferes with the job performance of those harassed.”218 This 
pronouncement is perplexing. A decline in job performance would certainly 
indicate that the harassment significantly affected the victim, but even absent a 
decline in performance the harassment may have intimidated her and altered her 
work conditions. A woman’s determination to cope with adversity and maintain 
a high level of job performance despite abusive conduct should not count against 
her.
The Ninth Circuit then set forth its view of hostile work environment claims 
based on a single incident.219 It began by noting that “[b]ecause only the 
employer can change the terms and conditions of employment, an isolated 
incident of harassment by a co-worker will rarely (if ever) give rise to a
reasonable fear that sexual harassment has become a permanent feature of the 
employment relationship.”220 The court explained this curious proposition by 
observing that when a harassment claim rests on a single incident “the employer 
will have had no advance notice and therefore cannot have sanctioned the 
harassment beforehand.”221 Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, “it
becomes difficult to say that a reasonable victim would feel that the terms and 
conditions of her employment have changed as a result of the misconduct.”222
This analysis conflates the employer’s fault for the harassment with an 
alteration in the conditions of the work environment. Employer condonation of,
or responsibility for, harassment is not an element of a hostile-work-
environment claim. Rather the plaintiff must prove that the harassing activity 
                                                                                                                     
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 922.
214 Id.
215 Brooks, 229 F.3d at 922.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 923.
219 Id. at 924.
220 Id.
221 Brooks, 229 F.3d at 924.
222 Id.
1084 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:6
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter her work conditions.223 The court’s
misstep in reasoning enabled it to conclude that Selvaggio’s conduct, “while 
relevant” to Brooks’ claim, was secondary to the conduct of the city.224
Perhaps the most troubling part of the court’s analysis was its discussion of 
Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc.,225 where an Illinois district court held a single 
incident sufficient to support a hostile-work-environment claim.226 In that case, 
the assailant battered and choked the victim, ripped off her shirt, forced her to 
have sex with him, and held her captive overnight.227 After her escape, she was 
hospitalized.228 The Brooks court observed: “If the incident here were as severe 
as that in Al-Dabbagh, we would have to grapple with the difficult question 
whether a single incident can so permeate the workplace as to support a hostile 
work environment claim.”229
If, as the Ninth Circuit suggests, a single incident of sexual battery,
kidnapping, and rape may not suffice to establish a hostile work environment 
claim, then the law is woefully misguided, and will serve neither as a sufficient 
instrument for punishment nor deterrence. But even in cases less egregious than 
Al-Dabbagh, discrimination law should effectively police sexual harassment.
The current approach, even when sensibly applied, countenances harassing 
conduct that most would find condemnable. A new approach should supplement 
the one in place. As shown in Part III, Congress should empower the EEOC to 
initiate enforcement proceedings against harassers who engage in highly 
offensive misconduct.
B. Unimpeachably Unwelcome
Another element of a hostile work environment claim is that the 
objectionable words or conduct must be unwelcome.230 Some courts have 
interpreted the “unwelcome” element to impose yet another barrier to claims 
alleging disturbing misconduct.231 These courts have burdened victims of 
                                                                                                                     
223 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993).
224 Brooks, 229 F.3d at 924.
225 Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
226 Brooks, 229 F.3d at 925 (citing Al-Dabbagh, 873 F. Supp. at 1111).
227 Id. at 926 (citing Al-Dabbagh, 873 F. Supp. at 1108).
228 Id. (citing Al-Dabbagh, 873 F. Supp. at 1108).
229 Id.
230 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (“The gravamen of any sexual 
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’” (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(a) (1985))).
231 See, e.g., Souther v. Posen Constr. Inc., 523 F. App’x 352, 353–55 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants, where plaintiff, a 
construction worker, never complained about protracted affair with her supervisor, despite 
her insistence at deposition that she was coerced); see infra note 232 (analyzing the issue of 
whether sexual advances and activity were welcome).
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sexual harassment with having to prove that they complained about the 
harassment, perhaps multiple times.232
In Blake v. MJ Optical, Inc.,233 Bobbette Blake was a longtime bench 
technician for MJ Optical.234 While attending Blake’s husband’s funeral, Marty 
Hagge, son of the owner of the company, a vice-president, and one of Blake’s
supervisors, allegedly grabbed Blake’s behind.235 Blake said, “What was that 
about?” and Hagge answered, “I thought you needed it.”236 In its summary of 
the facts, the Eight Circuit seemed to minimize this incident, commenting, 
“[t]hat was the entirety of the exchange.”237 But Marty’s pattern of inappropriate 
words and conduct was just getting started.238 He smacked or grabbed Blake’s
behind “various times during the workday,” though the Eighth Circuit 
characterized this misconduct as having occurred only “occasionally.”239 At 
least once, Blake flashed a dirty look at Marty, but her negative response did not 
stop him.240 She also alleged that Marty remarked, “you’d better watch those 
things [her breasts] because they’re going to poke my eyes out” and asked 
whether her nipples were “the size of nick[el]s or quarters.”241 Embarrassed, 
Blake purchased padded underwear, an act which certainly showed that Blake 
found Marty’s comments unwelcome.242 Blake explained that she did not report 
Marty’s wrongdoing because “it wouldn’t have done any good,” a sensible 
belief given that Marty was the owner’s son.243
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of MJ Optical,244 because Blake had failed to establish that Marty’s
offensive words and conduct were unwelcome.245 A plaintiff, held the court, 
must prove either that she complained to the company, formally or informally, 
                                                                                                                     
232 See Souther, 523 F. App’x at 355; see also Wisniewski v. Pontiac Sch. Dist., 862 
F. Supp. 2d 586, 597 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (holding that voluntary consent to sexual activity 
implies that subsequent similar sexual activity was welcome). See generally Kristy Dahl 
Rogers, Note, An Irresistible Attraction: Rethinking Romantic Jealousy as a Basis for Sex-
Discrimination Claims, 64 DUKE L.J. 1453, 1494–95 (2015) (arguing that a victim’s failure 
to report or complain about harassing conduct does not show that the conduct was welcome, 
but may reflect her fear of losing her job). 
233 Blake v. MJ Optical, Inc., 870 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2017).
234 Id. at 822. Over a period of forty years, Blake worked for the Hagge family, which 
first owned Shamrock, another eyeglass company, and later owned MJ Optical. Id. Marty 
Hagge, son of the owner, Michael Hagge, was the alleged harasser. Id.




239 Blake, 870 F.3d at 823.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. Blake also asserted an age discrimination claim, alleging, for example, that “he 
only kept her around to ‘watch her die.’” Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 822.
245 Blake, 870 F.3d at 828–30.
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or that she objected directly to the harasser.246 The court intimated that multiple 
complaints might well be necessary before a plaintiff had met this burden.247
Such an onerous standard contradicts the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Meritor.248 Meritor bank argued that because Mechelle Vinson had voluntarily 
had sex with Sidney Taylor, she welcomed his advances, and therefore forfeited 
her harassment claim.249 The Supreme Court rejected this proposition.250 A
plaintiff’s voluntary participation in sexual conduct does not necessarily negate 
her assertion that the sexual advances were unwelcome.251 The Supreme Court’s
viewpoint makes sense because the power imbalance between the harasser and 
the victim may account for the victim’s silence and acquiescence. The same 
principle applies to Blake’s response to Marty’s harassment. He was the son of 
the owner, a vice-president of the company, and one of her supervisors.252 One 
can hardly conceive of a more imbalanced power dynamic. Ignoring Blake’s
assertion that reporting the harassment of someone in such a position of power 
would have been futile, the court relied on irrelevancies.253 It noted that Blake 
and Marty had known each other for forty years, that their relationship was 
positive most of that time, and that Marty saw his conduct as an attempt “to 
lighten the mood.”254 None of these facts mitigate the abusiveness of his pattern 
of harassment.
C. Blatantly Discriminatory
As noted, federal law does not expressly proscribe sexual harassment. 
Rather, the courts have recognized that sexual harassment is a form of 
discrimination “because of sex.”255 It follows that sexual harassment is unlawful 
only if it is discriminatory.256 The federal courts have strictly applied the 
                                                                                                                     
246 Id. 828–29.
247 Id. at 829.
248 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986).
249 Id. at 68.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Blake, 870 F.3d at 822. See V. Blair Druhan, Note, Severe or Pervasive: An Analysis 
of Who, What, and Where Matters When Determining Sexual Harassment, 66 VAND. L. REV.
355, 377 (2013) (noting that one factor affecting the severity of harassing conduct, both 
objectively and subjectively, is the power and status of the harasser in the workplace).
253 Blake, 870 F.3d at 829.
254 Id.
255 Title VII provides as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or 
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
256 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (affirming that Title VII 
bans “requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment”); 
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discrimination element in sexual harassment cases, often refusing to infer 
discrimination when the facts implied a sex-based motive for offensive words 
or conduct.257 Proving sex discrimination in sexual harassment cases has 
therefore been the downfall of numerous claims.258
For example, in Graves v. Dayton Gastroenterology, Inc.,259 Graves worked 
as a certified nurse anesthetist for Dayton Gastroenterology.260 She and David 
Schum, a co-worker with authority over schedules and work assignments, had a
friendly relationship, occasionally exchanging text messages.261 While on 
vacation, Graves texted Schum, telling him, “I like being on vacation. I have 
done nothing all week.”262 Schum responded, “I [sic] happy for you, you just
have fun and wild sex.”263 Understandably, this text message offended Graves 
                                                                                                                     
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (“[W]hen a supervisor sexually 
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on 
the basis of sex.”).
257 See, e.g., Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2016). In that 
case, plaintiff alleged same-sex sexual harassment based on four separate occasions where 
Nick Reimer, a co-worker of Lord, slapped or grabbed Lord’s buttocks at work. Id. at 560. 
Affirming summary judgment for High Voltage Software, the Seventh Circuit found no 
triable issue of fact of discrimination because of sex. Id. at 562. The court stated, “Nothing 
suggests that Reimer was homosexual, and Reimer’s behavior was not so explicit or patently 
indicative of sexual arousal that a trier of fact could reasonably draw that conclusion. And 
neither the audio-bug joke [teasing Lord about his apparent interest in a female engineer] nor 
Reimer’s conduct reflect a general hostility to the presence of men in the workplace: Lord 
points to no facts suggesting that only male employees at High Voltage were the objects of 
this sort of teasing.” Id.; see also, e.g., Stancombe v. New Process Steel LP, 652 F. App’x 
729, 731–33 (11th Cir. 2016) (rejecting claim of sexual harassment where the harasser 
grabbed the victim’s buttocks three times, and in a second incident grabbed the victim’s head 
and thrust his pelvis into the victim’s face, and rationalizing the dismissal of the claim 
because the plaintiff made no showing that (1) the harasser was homosexual, (2) the harasser 
had hostility toward males in the workplace, and (3) the harasser treated the two sexes 
differently in the workplace); Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1121–23 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants on the 
ground that harassment was motivated by revenge rather than sex, although harasser grabbed 
victim’s crotch, made kissing gestures, and used vulgar phrases describing oral sex on 
several occasions). This cabined view of what might constitute sexual harassment is 
unjustified under Title VII. Victims were subjected to offensive treatment of a sexual nature 
in the workplace. No woman endured a similar treatment. That should be enough to establish 
differential treatment of the sexes. See infra notes 259–280 and accompanying text 
(analyzing sexual harassment cases where federal courts found no evidence of sex 
discrimination and granted defendants summary judgment, despite proof implying a sex-
based discriminatory motive). 
258 See supra note 257 and accompanying text (discussing the unreasonable view that 
some circuit courts have taken when assessing whether words or conduct was sexually 
discriminatory).
259 Graves v. Dayton Gastroenterology, Inc., 657 F. App’x 485 (6th Cir. 2016).
260 Id. at 485–86.
261 Id. at 486–87. 
262 Id. at 487.
263 Id.
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who did not reply.264 Schum, however, texted Graves one week later, saying, 
“You and your husband lay out a wonderful dinner, an [sic] have wild sex on 
the table!!!!! I do think about sex all the time. I [sic] just not getting it.”265 The 
next day, Graves reported both inappropriate text messages to Penno, her 
supervisor at Dayton Gastroenterology.266 When Schum texted Graves an 
apology, Graves responded that she would speak to him only about work-related 
matters.267 Angered, Schum retaliated by (1) refusing to answer her questions 
about work assignments, (2) assigning her the most difficult tasks at work, (3) 
denying her lunch breaks, (4) failing to provide her with updated work 
schedules, (5) rejecting her requests for days off, and (6) throwing a chart at 
her.268 This campaign of revenge drove Graves to resign.269
A divided Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s grant of 
defendants’ motion for summary judgement.270 Judge Daughtrey, writing for 
the majority, believed that Schum’s misconduct was not related to Graves’
gender, and therefore was not prohibited by Title VII’s proscription of 
discrimination because of sex.271 The court listed the types of misconduct that 
support claims of gender-based animus.272 The list included (1) differential 
treatment of males and females, (2) expressions of hostility toward females, (3)
physical harassment, and (4) the request for sexual favors.273 Neither evidence 
of Schum’s text messages, nor evidence of his retaliation supported Graves’
argument that she suffered discrimination because of sex.274
Judge Karen Nelson Moore filed a persuasive dissent.275 She argued that a 
jury might infer from Schum’s texts that he wanted to have sex with Graves.276
Such a motive showed differential treatment of a woman because of her gender 
                                                                                                                     
264 Id.




269 Id. Before tendering her resignation, Graves suffered anxiety, headaches, and nausea 
because of Schum’s abusive conduct. Id. She began a new job as a nurse anesthetist the 
month following her resignation. Id.
270 Id. at 486.
271 Graves, 657 F. App’x at 487–88.
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 488–89. But see, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19–21 (1993) 
(finding non-sexually motivated conduct based on plaintiff’s gender sufficient to state a 
claim of hostile work environment); David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The 
Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1723–24 (2002) 
(noting that non-sexually motivated conduct meets the “because of sex” requirement of Title 
VII and therefore may constitute sexual harassment). 
274 Graves, 657 F. App’x at 489.
275 Id. at 490 (Nelson Moore, J., dissenting).
276 Id. at 490–91. Judge Nelson Moore observed that by “[r]equiring defendants to reveal 
their motives outright would punish only the most vulgar harassers and reward those smart 
enough to speak in subtleties.” Id. at 491. One might broaden the judge’s point by noting 
that the majority’s standard countenances harassment that is not at all subtle.
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and therefore was proof of sex discrimination.277 Drawing an analogy to racial 
discrimination, she refuted the argument that Schum’s text messages would 
have been equally offensive whether sent to a man or a woman.278 It might be 
acceptable, she observed, for a white worker to repeatedly disparage a white co-
worker’s hair, but the same comment might be proof of racial harassment if the 
white worker directed the disparaging comments at a black co-worker.279
Furthermore, Judge Nelson Moore argued that Schum’s subsequent retaliatory 
conduct was arguably “rooted in sexual desire and rejection.”280
D. Intolerably Hostile Work Environment
The last element of a hostile-work-environment claim is alteration of the 
work environment.281 Some federal courts have, either expressly or implicitly, 
interpreted this standard to mean “pollution” of the work environment, though 
the Supreme Court expressly rejected such an extreme standard.282
1. More Than Severe
Even if the offensive words or conduct are severe or pervasive, they may 
not be so severe or pervasive that they altered the work environment. The 
Eleventh Circuit embraced this curious formulation in Stancombe v. New 
Process Steel LP.283 Stancombe, an employee of New Process Steel, banded 
steel coil products.284 During Stancombe’s one-month tenure of employment, 
Woodfin, a co-employee, subjected Stancombe to two incidents of 
harassment.285 In the first incident, Woodfin hugged Stancombe and touched 
his buttocks three times.286 Stancombe reported the incident to his supervisor.287
                                                                                                                     
277 Id. at 491.
278 Id.
279 Graves, 657 F. App’x at 491 (Nelson Moore, J., dissenting). She offered another 
analogy. It would be acceptable if a Christian worker suggested that a Christian co-worker 
dress up for Halloween as Osama bin Laden, but the same suggestion directed to a Muslin 
co-employee might evidence discrimination based on religion. Id.
280 Id.
281 See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (citing 
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“When the workplace is permeated with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, 
Title VII is violated.”).
282 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (remarking that, although the 
Taylor’s gross misconduct in Meritor “polluted” Vinson’s work environment, such 
“egregious examples of harassment . . . do not mark the boundary of what is actionable”).
283 Stancombe v. New Process Steel LP, 652 F. App’x 729, 735 (11th Cir. 2016).
284 Id. at 731.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. Stancombe’s supervisor, Joe Young, passed the complaint along to Doug Logan, 
the production manager. Id. Logan then met with Stancombe and assured him that the 
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Only two days later, Woodfin approached Stancombe, grabbed his head and 
Woodfin thrusted his pelvis three times in Stancombe’s face.288 Shocked, 
Stancombe left the plant premises and quit his job.289
Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
defendants, the Eleventh Circuit made a perplexing observation.290 The court 
explained: “While the second incident [pelvic thrusting into Stancombe’s head] 
arguably was severe . . . Stancombe demonstrated no pattern of harassment and 
presented no other supporting evidence of an abusive working environment.”291
The court concluded therefore that “the two isolated incidents were not so severe
as to amount to a discriminatory change in terms and conditions of 
employment.”292 The Eleventh Circuit required something more than severe 
misconduct, though it did not clarify how egregious misconduct must be to alter 
the work environment.
2. The Time Trap
Unlike LeGrand, where the Eighth Circuit discounted the effects of three 
incidents because they were spread over six months, the Stancombe court found 
that the two harassing incidents did not alter the work environment because both 
occurred within a short span of time.293 The passage of time, whether long or 
short, is apparently a victim’s enemy.
3. Conflation of the Objective and Subjective Tests
The Stancombe court emphasized that Woodfin’s offensive conduct was not 
“so objectively offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s
employment.”294 Although Stancombe resigned immediately after the second 
incident, the court concluded oddly that the harassment did not interfere with 
                                                                                                                     
company took sexual harassment claims seriously. Id. Logan then took written statements 
from Stancombe and Woodfin, transferred Stancombe to a different department, and 
instructed Woodfin to avoid contact with Stancombe. Id.
288 Id.
289 Stancombe, 652 F. App’x at 731. He did not express his resignation directly to New 
Process Steel. Id. Rather, two days later he conveyed his resignation to the staffing agency 
that had secured the job for him. Id. Thereafter, New Process Steel conducted an 
investigation into Stancombe’s complaint of sexual harassment. Id. Though no other 
employee validated Stancombe’s allegations, Woodfin admitted that he had put his arm 
around Stancombe, and the company had disciplined him for a prior incident where he hit 
another employee on the buttocks while the employee bent over. Id. at 731–32. These facts 
suggest that Woodfin’s co-employees may have been covering for him.
290 Id. at 730–31.
291 Id. at 736.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 735.
294 Id. at 735–36 (emphasis added) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 
523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
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Stancombe’s job performance.295 The court’s rationale was flimsy: if
Stancombe had returned to work, the court explained, he would not have worked 
alongside Woodfin because, after the first incident, Stancombe’s supervisor had 
transferred him to another department.296 Having found that the harassment did 
not affect Stancombe’s job performance, the court muddled the objective and 
subjective tests for sexual harassment claims. In Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.,297 the Supreme Court enumerated factors that a court should weigh in 
determining whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
establish a hostile work environment.298 The court included, among these 
factors, “whether [the discriminatory conduct] unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance.”299 The word “unreasonably” indicates an 
objective alteration of the work environment. 
By assessing the effects of the harassment on Stancombe’s job performance 
without assessing how the harassment might reasonably have affected his job 
performance, the Eleventh Circuit misapplied the Harris standard. Stancombe’s
job performance was relevant to assessing his subjective response to the 
harassment but it was irrelevant to assessing whether the harassment objectively 
altered his working conditions.300 The objective test focuses on how a 
reasonable person would act, not on how the plaintiff reacted. A hypersensitive 
plaintiff might experience a decline in performance or even quit a job for 
objectively minor reasons. 
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, one element of a sexual harassment claim is 
that the victim must feel subjectively that the harassment altered the conditions 
of her employment.301 By resigning his job immediately after Woodfin thrust 
                                                                                                                     
295 Stancombe, 652 F. App’x at 735.
296 Id.
297 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
298 The Court explained as follows:
[W]e can say that whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” can be determined 
only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, 
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with an 
employee’s work performance. 
Id. at 23.
299 Id. (emphasis added).
300 See, e.g., Graves v. Dayton Gastroenterology, Inc., 657 F. App’x 485, 488 (6th Cir. 
2016) (“In assessing whether Graves established a genuine dispute as to the objective prong, 
we must consider . . . whether [discrimination] unreasonably interfered with an employee’s 
performance.”); LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. Human Serv., 394 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (listing a decline in plaintiff’s job performance as an objective factor).
301 See, e.g., Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (“So long as the environment would reasonably be 
perceived, and is perceived as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be 
psychologically injurious.”); Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting 
that to have a claim for hostile work environment “the victim must also subjectively perceive 
that environment to be abusive”); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 
1999) (noting that, to state a claim for hostile work environment, the victim must perceive 
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his pelvis into Stancombe’s face, Stancombe’s reaction was doubtless sufficient 
to meet the subjective test. It also seems clear that the facts met the objective 
test. A reasonable person would have found Woodfin’s misconduct so 
intolerable that he well might have quit to remove himself from the work 
environment.
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Stancombe, the Eighth Circuit in Scusa v. Nestle 
U.S.A. Co., Inc.,302 conflated the subjective and objective tests.303 The court 
posited that interference with the victim’s work performance is one determinant 
of whether a reasonable person would have found the harassment sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the victim’s work environment.304 Then, as a basis 
for rejecting Scusa’s assertion that the work environment was hostile, the court 
seized on the fact that Scusa “was able to work full shifts and perform all of her 
duties.”305
It might appear irrelevant whether the victim’s work performance is treated 
as relevant to the objective or subjective test. However, substituting a plaintiff’s
subjective reaction for the objective reaction of a reasonable person might be
outcome determinative. Suppose the victim of severe and pervasive harassment 
persevered through adversity and maintained her level of performance. If she 
were litigating before the Eighth or Eleventh Circuits, her grittiness would 
weigh against her argument that a reasonable person would have found the work 
environment altered. The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits might therefore 
erroneously reject her claim on the ground that she failed to meet the objective 
test.
E. “Tangibly” Supervisory
By holding that a supervisor must have authority to take tangible 
employment actions against the victim, Vance v. Ball State University306 has 
shielded employers from vicarious liability. For example, in McCafferty v. 
Preiss Enterprises, Inc.307 McCafferty, a fifteen-year-old, worked for a 
McDonald’s franchise restaurant, owned by Preiss.308 Peterson was a swing 
                                                                                                                     
the objectionable conduct as so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her 
employment).
302 Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., Inc., 181 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999). 
303 Id. at 967.
304 Id.
305 Id. The court found other reasons to dispose of plaintiff’s harassment claim. Id. at
965–66. It rejected her assertion that insulting words and aggressive conduct directed at her 
were based on her sex. Id. at 965. It also was unpersuaded that foul language hurled at her 
by co-workers was unwelcome, because she had uttered equally offensive epithets at them. 
Id. at 966.
306 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
307 McCafferty v. Preiss Enters., Inc., 534 F. App’x 726 (10th Cir. 2013).
308 Id. at 727–28. McCafferty falsely stated her age as sixteen on the employment 
application form. Id. at 727. 
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manager at the restaurant.309 He had broad authority to direct the work activities 
of employees, including assigning duties, scheduling breaks, extending hours, 
sending employees home if the restaurant was overstaffed, and imposing 
disciplinary measures.310 Although he had significant influence over decisions 
to promote, hire, and fire employees, he did not have unilateral authority to take 
any of these actions.311 Sometimes, Peterson was the manager with the highest 
level of authority at the restaurant.312
On March 26, 2007, McCafferty agreed to cover the shift of another 
employee.313 After arranging for McCafferty’s early dismissal from school the
next day, Peterson picked her up ostensibly to drive her to work, but instead he 
informed her that her shift was canceled.314 He drove her to a friend’s house 
where he fed her drugs and alcohol and had sex with her.315 Later, he took her
to his house where, for two days, he kept her high and continued to sexually 
abuse her.316 On March 29, McCafferty’s sister saw her in Peterson’s car, 
rescued her, and contacted the police.317
McCafferty filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging that Preiss 
was vicariously liable for Peterson’s harassment.318 The district court granted 
Preiss summary judgment on the claim of vicarious liability, holding that under 
Vance, Peterson was not McCafferty’s supervisor.319 Affirming dismissal of the 
complaint, the Tenth Circuit ruled that, although Peterson had the authority to 
direct all of McCafferty’s day-to-day work activities, he lacked the power to 
take tangible employment actions against her.320
                                                                                                                     




313 McCafferty, 534 F. App’x at 728. It appears that the person who asked her to cover 
this shift might have been an impostor. Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id. On March 27, 2007, McCafferty’s grandfather reported her missing. Id.
317 Id. at 729. McCafferty was admitted to a hospital and later to the Wyoming 
Behavioral Institute where she received treatment for depression, drug dependence, and post-
traumatic stress disorder. Id.
318 Id. She also asserted numerous state law claims. Id.
319 McCafferty, 534 F. App’x at 729.
320 Id. at 731. McCafferty also argued that Preiss was liable because Peterson acted with 
apparent authority, but the court rejected this argument, noting that Peterson’s misconduct 
was disconnected from the workplace and could not be tied to any appearance of authority 
that Preiss created. Id. at 732. McCafferty also sued Preiss for several state-law claims. The 
court dismissed her negligent hiring claim because, when Preiss hired Peterson, Preiss had 
no way of knowing that Peterson posed a danger to employees. Id. at 733. Similarly, the 
court rejected McCafferty’s negligent supervision and retention claims because Peterson’s 
criminality was outside the scope of his employment. Id. McCafferty also asserted a claim 
based on ratification. She argued that after her abduction and rescue Preiss continued to 
employ and even promoted Peterson. Id. at 733–34. The court saw no merit in this argument 
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The McCafferty case exposes the fault in the Vance decision. Although 
Preiss did not authorize Peterson to hire and fire employees, Preiss conferred 
supervisory powers on Peterson that enabled him to manipulate, abduct, and 
rape McCafferty. Peterson was therefore aided by his agency powers when he 
deceived and abused McCafferty. Yet, under Vance, Peterson was not 
McCafferty’s supervisor and thus Preiss was exonerated.
IV. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS TO DETER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Parts II and III of this Article showed that the law has failed to curb sexual 
harassment in the workplace. The current regime therefore needs restructuring. 
First, federal courts should not interpret the controlling Supreme Court decisions 
to permit abuses similar to those committed in LeGrand v. Area Resources for 
Community and Human Services321 and Brooks v. City of San Mateo.322 Such 
decisions distort the standard that the Supreme Court established. Second, 
Congress should overrule Vance and enact a more inclusive standard for 
“supervisor.” These changes would improve the deterrent effect of sexual 
harassment law. Though necessary, however, these changes are not sufficient. 
Part IV explains in more depth why the existing approach has failed and then 
proposes a new regime that would complement the existing approach, as
modified, and would provide more effective deterrence.
A. The Framework of Conciliation and Litigation
The EEOC is the federal agency empowered to administer Title VII, and 
Congress has prescribed a detailed procedural framework under which the 
EEOC functions.323 A person with a discrimination grievance may file a 
complaint with the EEOC, or a member of the EEOC may file a charge on behalf 
of an aggrieved party.324 The agency will investigate the charge and try to 
eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practice.325 It will use informal methods,
such as conferencing with the parties, and will try to persuade them to conciliate 
the grievance.326 If the parties fail to settle the claim, the EEOC may commence 
a federal court action,327 though it does so in a small minority of cases.328 If it 
                                                                                                                     
because Preiss had no actual knowledge of the abuses that Peterson had committed. Id. at
734. 
321 LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2005).
322 Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000).




327 Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
328 See EEOC Litigation Statistics, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
www.eeoc.gov/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm [https://perma.cc/865D-34R8] 
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does s.//o, it will seek relief, such as backpay and damages, on behalf of the 
victim.329 If, as in most cases, the EEOC elects not bring an action, it will issue 
a right-to-sue letter to the complainant, and authorize the commencement of a 
lawsuit in federal court.330
Conciliating and settling claims avoids the costs and uncertainties of 
litigation. Some claims are not serious enough to justify federal court actions, 
and a settlement may steer an employer toward meaningful prevention. But this 
approach has drawbacks. Once having negotiated a settlement, an employer may 
revert to complacency. For example, an employer, under the terms of a 
settlement agreement, may adopt strong anti-harassment policies, but once out 
of the EEOC’s spotlight, it may be lax in enforcing them. Furthermore, when a 
company and the EEOC negotiate a settlement, the terms are kept 
confidential.331 By evading public scrutiny, an employer avoids the risk of
reputational injury. Fear of a public backlash might impel otherwise apathetic
employers to take a vigorous stance against harassment.332
To deter sexual harassment in the workplace, the law needs an approach that 
is more aggressive than conciliation and settlement. Managers must endure the 
rigors of cross-examination at legal proceedings, and employers must face stiff 
                                                                                                                     
(reporting that the total number of EEOC Title VII litigations, including those alleging sexual 
harassment, were as follows: 78 in 2013, 76 in 2014, 83 in 2015, 46 in 2016, and 107 in 
2017).
329 See Litigation, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/ [https://perma.cc/E8LH-A7FB] (stating when the 
EEOC commences federal court actions, it seeks remedies on behalf of a complaining party).
330 KJ Henderson, Process for an EEOC Complaint, HOUS. CHRON.,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/process-eeoc-complaint-1315.html 
[https://perma.cc/2HPJ-LDJF]. In pursuing federal discrimination claims under Title VII, 
one must follow administrative procedures prescribing strict time limitations. If a recognized 
state or local agency has jurisdiction to evaluate an employee's charge of discrimination, the 
employee must file a claim with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged wrong or within 
60 days of the state or local agency’s final determination of the matter, whichever is shorter. 
Id. In other states, the claimant has 180 days to file with the EEOC. Once a claim is filed, 
the EEOC will investigate the charge. Id. If the EEOC finds no probable cause that a violation 
occurred, it will issue a right-to-sue letter to the claimant, who then has 90 days to commence 
a federal court action. Id. If the EEOC finds probable cause, it will attempt to conciliate the 
dispute. Id. If the parties cannot reach settlement, the EEOC will issue a right-to-sue letter 
to the claimant, who has 90 days to commence a federal court action. The EEOC may 
commence and litigate actions on behalf of victims of discrimination. Id.; see also §§ 2000e-
(d) & 2000e-(e)(1).
331 See What You Should Know: The EEOC, Conciliation and Litigation, EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Feb. 9, 2018), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/council
iation/litigation.cfm [https://perma.cc/X4SL-F54A] (commenting that settlement 
agreements between the EEOC and employers charged with unlawful discrimination are kept 
confidential); see also EEOC Harassment Statistics, supra note 4 (reporting that the EEOC 
settled 786 sexual harassment cases in 2014 or 11.2% of such cases filed with the EEOC, 
834 such cases in 2015 or 11.4%, 698 such cases in 2016 or 9.4%, and 662 in 2017 or 8.8%).
332 See supra notes 8–19 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of public opinion 
on forcing employers to take disciplinary action against harassers). 
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penalties for inaction and complicity in workplace abuses. The litigation prong 
of the current approach might seem to meet this concern, but it does not. Current 
law discourages victims from litigating serious claims.333 The low chance of 
success does not justify the costs and emotional toll of protracted litigation. As 
shown in Part III, judges routinely grant summary judgment to employers,
dismissing claims that allege compelling facts.334 In some of these cases, lower 
courts have misapplied the standard established in Meritor, Harris, and Oncale.
But even where courts have applied the standard correctly, they often reject 
claims alleging highly offensive behavior.335
One reason for the failure of the current litigation approach is that it focuses 
primarily on compensation rather than on deterrence. In National R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,336 Justice Thomas acknowledged the primacy of 
“Title VII’s remedial purpose.”337 As a remedial statute, Title VII provides a 
mechanism for compensating the victims of discrimination.338 Awarding 
individualized remedies may confer a measure of justice on one plaintiff at a 
time, but may be an ineffective method for achieving broad-based gains against 
the pandemic.339 Furthermore, if the standard for hostile-work-environment 
liability were lowered, the scales might tip to over-sensitivity. Some plaintiffs
might burden courts with complaints not worthy of legal redress. A surge of 
such claims would force the expenditure of substantial judicial resources.
For these reasons, all the elements of a hostile-work-environment claim, 
enunciated in Meritor and Harris, make sense. Offensive behavior that is not 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to objectively alter a victim’s work conditions 
would signal a lack of injury.340 As a general rule, absent injury, a plaintiff has 
no compensable claim.341 Requiring a victim to feel subjectively that sexual 
misconduct created a hostile work environment also establishes injury, though 
this requirement overlaps with the “unwelcome” element because both indicate 
a victim’s reaction to harassment.342 This redundancy notwithstanding, these 
                                                                                                                     
333 See supra Part III (analyzing cases where courts, deciding hostile-work-environment 
cases, have denied deserving plaintiffs relief).
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
337 Id. at 121.
338 EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 328 (describing the EEOC’s use of litigation).
339 See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (declaring that 
deterrence of sexual misconduct in the workplace is a major policy underlying Title VII).
340 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
341 See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34, § 3531.4 (discussing the constitutional 
requirement of injury before a plaintiff is entitled to compensation).
342 See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2013) 
(arguing that “unwelcomeness” is subjective); Larsa K. Ramsini, Note, The Unwelcome 
Requirement in Sexual Harassment: Choosing a Perspective and Incorporating the Effect of 
Supervisor-Subordinate Relations, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1961, 1969–70, 1977–78, 1997
(2014) (observing that the subjective requirement and the unwelcome requirement may be 
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elements of a hostile-work-environment claim are justifiable in Title VII 
litigation because the primary purpose of such litigation is to compensate injured 
parties.343
It is therefore necessary to create an approach that is not based on the 
compensatory model. The rest of Part III proposes such an approach, attempts 
to demonstrate its reasonableness, and seeks to justify its efficacy as a deterrent 
to sexual harassment in the workplace.
B. A New Standard of Liability
Congress should empower the EEOC to commence both federal court 
enforcement proceedings and quasi-judicial proceedings in which it does not 
seek to compensate victims of sexual harassment.344 The purpose of such 
enforcement proceedings would be, through civil sanctions, to punish employers 
who have facilitated harassment or who have failed to take serious remedial 
action. In such proceedings, the EEOC would be relieved of having to prove a
victim’s injury. The reduced burden on the EEOC would prevent irresponsible 
employers from escaping liability.
One might object to this proposal, questioning whether an agency should 
ever benefit from reduced requirements of proof. It might seem unprecedented 
or even unfair to relieve an agency of requirements that a private litigant would 
have to meet. Such an approach, however, would be neither unprecedented nor 
unfair. To find an example where such an approach is in place, one need look 
no further than securities law and the SEC.
C. A Model: SEC Civil Enforcement Actions for Securities Fraud
Section 10(b), of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934345 and its regulatory 
complement, Rule 10b-5,346 make it unlawful “[t]o employ any device, scheme 
or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”347 Section 10(b) authorizes both private rights of action,348 and SEC 
                                                                                                                     
redundant and proposing that, in cases of alleged supervisor harassment of subordinates, the 
law should presume the accuser found the sexual conduct unwelcome subject to disproof 
offered by the employer).
343 See EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 328.
344 This Article refers to both EEOC federal court enforcement actions and EEOC quasi-
judicial enforcement proceedings as “enforcement proceedings.”
345 Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
75j(b) (2012)).
346 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). This Article refers to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
interchangeably. 
347 Id.
348 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980) (“Another facet of civil 
enforcement [beyond an SEC civil action] is a private cause of action for money damages, 
[which] unlike the Commission injunctive action, is not expressly authorized by statute, but 
rather has been judicially implied.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) 
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civil enforcement proceedings in federal court.349 The SEC also has wide 
latitude in bringing quasi-judicial enforcement proceedings.350 Although 
deterrence is one of the purposes of a private right of action, the more 
fundamental purpose served by private actions brought under section 10(b) is to 
provide injured parties with a means to recover financial losses from those who 
commit securities fraud.351 The purposes of SEC enforcement proceedings are 
more wide ranging than those of a private civil action.352 The mission of the 
SEC is to protect the investing public, safeguard the integrity of the securities 
markets, and promote capital formation.353 The SEC has numerous tools to 
                                                                                                                     
(“Although § 10(b) does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for its violation, and 
there is no indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, 
contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action for violations of the 
statute and the Rule is now well established.”); Superintendent of Ins. N.Y. v. Bankers Life 
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971) (recognizing that, although the words of section 
10(b) do not explicitly authorize a private right of action, the section implicitly provides that 
right). 
349 Section 21e of the Exchange Act provides: 
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to 
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter, the 
rules or regulations thereunder . . . . [I]t may in its discretion bring an action in the proper 
district court of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, or the United States courts of any territory or other place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper 
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without 
bond. 
48 Stat. at 900, as amended 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(1) (2015); see, e.g., Kokesh v. SEC., 137 
S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017) (“If an investigation uncovers evidence of wrongdoing, the 
Commission may initiate enforcement actions in federal district court.”).
350 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77h-1, 78u-2, 80a-9, 80b-3 (2012) (expanding the quasi-judicial authority of the SEC to 
cover virtually any securities law violation); see also David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion 
of the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1164–65 (2016) (noting that Dodd-Frank empowered the 
SEC to hear in a quasi-judicial proceeding nearly any claim that it may bring in a federal 
court enforcement proceedings).
351 See, e.g., Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 949–50 (3d Cir. 
1985) (observing that recognition of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 provides 
compensation to injured investors while deterring future violations); Justin Marocco, When 
Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the Rule 10b-5 Private Action as a Fraud-
Deterrence Mechanism Post-Janus, 73 LA. L. REV. 633, 634 (2013) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court has gutted the deterrent effect of Rule 10b-5 by eliminating from the field of 
potential securities-fraud parties who did not “make” fraudulent misrepresentations). 
352 See Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 451–52 (comparing the policies underlying the private action 
to the policies underlying the SEC enforcement action).
353 The SEC mission statement provides: “The mission of the SEC is to protect investors, 
maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation. The SEC strives 
to promote a market environment that is worthy of the public’s trust.” About the SEC, SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N (2017), https://sec.gov/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/HMS8-54LV]. As 
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achieve these broad policy objectives, some of which are denied to private 
litigants.354 For example, private litigants have no claim against secondary 
actors,355 whereas the SEC may bring suit against aiders and abettors of 
securities fraud.356
When the SEC commences federal court enforcement actions or quasi-
judicial proceedings, it seeks to punish wrongdoers with remedies that range 
from injunctions, to disgorgement of unlawful gains, to monetary penalties.357
Though it may devise a plan to return disgorged funds and disperse civil 
penalties to victims who prove their losses, it is not directly representing those 
victims.358 Therefore, when alleging securities fraud under section 10(b), the 
SEC, in enforcement proceedings, is not required to prove all the elements that 
private litigants must prove. A private litigant, alleging securities fraud must 
establish six elements: (1) material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter,
                                                                                                                     
noted in Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 451 (2013), “The SEC…is not like an individual 
victim who relies on apparent injury to learn of a wrong. Rather a central ‘mission’ of the 
Commission is to ‘investigat[e] potential violations of the federal securities laws,’” (quoting 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 1 (2012)). “Unlike the private party 
who has no reason to suspect fraud, the SEC’s very purpose is to root it out . . . . The 
Government in these types of cases also seeks a different type of relief. The discovery rule 
helps to ensure that the injured receive recompense, but civil penalties go beyond 
compensation, [sic] are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers.”).
354 For example, Section 21(b) of the Exchange Act provides: “[A]ny member of the 
Commission or any officer designated by it is empowered to administer oaths and 
affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, and require the 
production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records which the 
Commission deems relevant or material to [a Commission] inquiry.” 48 Stat. at 900 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (2015)).
355 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (denying that private litigants under section 10(b) may seek redress 
from aiders and abettors of securities law violations).
356 Exchange Act § 20(e) provides: “For purposes of any action brought by the 
Commission under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this title, any person that 
knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a 
provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter, shall be 
deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such 
assistance is provided.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012); see, e.g., Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 445 (noting 
that the SEC has the authority to initiate claims for aiding and abetting a securities law 
violation).
357 See Linda Chatman Thomsen, An Overview of Enforcement, INST. FOR SEC. MKT.
DEV. (2005), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/overviewenfor.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3EA-R99M] (discussing remedies available to the SEC); see also Mary 
Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at N.Y.U. School of Law Program on 
Corporate Compliance and Enforcement: A New Model for SEC Enforcement: Producing 
Bold and Unrelenting Results (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-
white-speech-new-york-university-111816.html [https://perma.cc/4A8E-KKNX] (stressing 
that the SEC’s enforcement program focuses on investor protection and capital formation).
358 See B. Seth McNew, Money Penalties Against Publicly Held Companies: A Proposal 
for Restraint, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 48, 54 (2009) (explaining that the SEC may provide a plan 
for the distribution of penalties and disgorged funds to injured investors).
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(3) reasonable reliance, (4) “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a 
security, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.359 Because the SEC, in 
enforcement proceedings, does not directly represent injured investors, it need 
not prove that a victim of a fraud relied on a misrepresentation or omission, that 
the fraud caused financial loss, or that any victim of the fraud sustained a loss.360
This retrenchment of the SEC’s burden promotes deterrence of securities fraud 
and thus advances the policies of federal securities law.
The approach taken in the arena of securities regulation would work well if 
adapted to the law of sexual harassment. As shown below, the EEOC’s
enforcement powers need expansion, and the elements of a hostile-work-
environment claim in expanded enforcement proceedings need reshaping.
D. Expanded Power to Bring Federal Court Enforcement Actions
As noted above, the EEOC may commence federal lawsuits on behalf of 
complainants, but it lacks the power to bring civil enforcement actions on its 
own behalf.361 Congress should grant the EEOC powers analogous to those 
conferred on the SEC.
E. Quasi-Judicial Power
The EEOC’s quasi-judicial authority is also limited.362 It may institute 
administrative enforcement proceedings only for complaints of federal 
employees.363 These powers should be broadened. Congress should grant the 
                                                                                                                     
359 See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 460–61 (2013) 
(setting forth the elements that a private litigant must prove to recover damages); Stoneridge 
Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (listing the elements of a 
private right of action under section 10(b)); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–
46 (2005) (discussing the elements of economic loss and loss causation, after setting forth 
the six required elements of a private civil action alleging a violation of section 10(b)).
360 See e.g., SEC v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 678 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(enumerating the elements of an SEC enforcement action for a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 claim).
361 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012).
362 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(a) (2012).
363 See id. (providing that this part applies to discrimination and retaliation complaints 
arising under Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination laws); § 1614.108(c)(1) 
(providing that the right conferred in this regulation applies to “any employee of a federal 
agency” with a complaint of unlawful discrimination), and sub-section (g) (providing “the 
complainant may request a hearing by submitting a written request for a hearing directly to 
the EEOC”); § 1614.109 (prescribing procedures for hearings conducted by ALJs, including 
procedures for discovery, summary judgment motions, and the conduct of hearings); see also 
JOSEPH M. CREED, MARYLAND EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK at 9–12 (2016) (noting that 
the ALJ may, in his or her discretion limit the scope of discovery, dispose of cases 
summarily, ignore the formal rules of evidence, and regulate the conduct at the hearing, and 
that the complainant may appeal the ALJ’s decision to the EEOC, and thereafter appeal the 
EEOC’s decision to a federal circuit court).
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EEOC quasi-judicial authority to hear all complaints of sexual harassment.364
There is precedent for providing a civil rights administrative agency with broad 
quasi-judicial enforcement authority. One example is the New York State 
Human Rights Division (HRD), the administrative agency charged with 
enforcing New York’s Human Rights Law.365 The HRD may both entertain and 
initiate civil rights complaints, and conduct quasi-judicial administrative 
proceedings to determine whether a violation has occurred.366
The EEOC administrative enforcement process would begin with one or 
more parties making a formal or informal complaint to the EEOC. Such a 
complaint would trigger an EEOC investigation. Unlike the existing approach, 
conciliation and settlement of serious wrongdoing would not be a priority of the 
EEOC. If, after investigating, the EEOC found reasonable grounds to conduct a 
hearing, it would assign the case to an administrative law judge (ALJ).367
Similar to the current procedures in place for an EEOC hearing of a federal
employee’s complaint, the ALJ could streamline pre-hearing procedures.368
Expedited discovery and minimal motion practice would avert untoward 
delay.369 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, if the ALJ found against the 
employer, the ALJ could impose a fine and, as appropriate, order declaratory or 
injunctive relief.370 The party losing the hearing would have the right to appeal 
to the EEOC and then to a federal circuit court.371
                                                                                                                     
364 The same approach might be applied to other unlawful forms of discriminatory 
harassment in the workplace.
365 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 295(6)(b), (7) (McKinney 2010) (empowering the HRD, on 
its own motion, to hear civil right complaints administratively); New York State Division of 
Human Rights, Rules of Practice, General Regulations § 465.3(a)(1) & (3) (2018), 
http://dhr.ny.gov/rules-practice [https://perma.cc/5S6Z-UFX3] (stating that any person or 
organization, or the HRD, on its own motion, may file a complaint).
366 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 295(6)(b), (7).
367 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–56 (2012) (prescribing the 
powers of an administrative law judge presiding over evidentiary hearings, and requiring that 
such hearings comport with due process); see also Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of 
Administrative Law Judge Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 476, 
476–77 (2011) (summarizing the powers of administrative law judges).
368 See Federal EEO Complaint Processing Procedures, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fedprocess.cfm [https://perma.cc/4VCA-
BN2F] (describing EEOC hearing procedures now in place for complaints of federal 
employees); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (prescribing the 
discretionary powers of administrative law judges to allow discovery and other procedures 
such as motion practice); Solomon, supra note 367 and accompanying text at 476–77 (listing 
the discretionary powers of administrative law judges).
369 See 5 U.S.C. § 556.
370 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 12.13(b)(1)(viii) (2015) (setting forth the powers of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to impose fines and non-monetary 
sanctions).
371 See 17 C.F.R. § 148.29 (2015) (providing that federal circuit courts hear appeals from 
the CFTC).
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F. The Requirements for an EEOC Enforcement Proceeding Alleging
Hostile Work Environment
Because the EEOC, in enforcement proceedings, would not seek 
compensation for a victim, it would not have to prove any of the elements of an 
existing sexual harassment claim that touch on the issue of injury. To prove 
unlawful harassment, the EEOC would have to meet the following standard: that 
discriminatory words or conduct of a sexual or gender-related nature would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
1. Severe or Pervasive
The EEOC should not have to prove that harassment was severe or 
pervasive. This standard has allowed employers of flagrant harassers to escape 
retribution.372 In LeGrand v. Area Resources for Community and Human 
Services,373 Father Nutt twice invited LeGrand to watch pornographic movies
and jerk him off, and later kissed him, grabbed his buttocks and reached for his 
genitals.374 After all this, the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the 
defendant. It is unacceptable that the law of sexual harassment permits such 
behavior. Nor should Paula Jones have had to endure a governor exposing and 
fondling his penis.375 And Brooks should not have had to tolerate Selvaggio’s
reaching under her clothing and fondling her bare breast.376
As noted, the EEOC should have to prove that the harassing words or 
conduct would have been highly offensive to a reasonable person. To determine 
whether words or conduct meet this standard, the EEOC should consider their 
nature, seriousness, and frequency, and the power relationship between the 
harasser and the victim. Courts should accord particular weight to threats, 
bribes, and other inducements to pressure a victim to acquiesce to sexual 
advances.377 An objective “highly offensive” standard would not realize 
concerns expressed in Oncale378 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton379 that the 
law might impose a civility code. If the proposed standard were implemented, 
                                                                                                                     
372 See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing cases in which multiple incidents of flagrant 
harassment resulted judgment for the defendants).
373 LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1098 (8th Cir. 
2005).
374 Id. at 1100.
375 Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 664 (E.D. Ark. 1998). 
376 Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2000).
377 Cf. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (listing the factors that 
determine whether sexual misconduct is severe or pervasive). 
378 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (stating that the 
statutory requirements for establishing sexual harassment, whether involving people of the 
same sex or not, prevent the law from becoming a civility code).
379 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (reiterating Oncale’s 
assurance that the law, applied correctly, is not overbroad in what sexual words and conduct 
it condemns). 
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the workplace would not devolve into a trap where every word uttered with a 
hint of sexuality might set off alarms. The standard proposed in this Article does
not drop the bar unreasonably. It lowers the standard only far enough to 
condemn behavior that would be highly offensive to unbiased observers. The 
occasional salacious joke, insult, or provocative remark may be boorish, but 
most reasonable people would not find such misbehavior highly offensive.
The misbehaviors of Bill Clinton, Father Nutt, and Selvaggio would all 
seem sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate the current standard. But 
regardless of whether one believes that such misconduct was severe or 
pervasive, these judicial decisions frustrate the goal of deterrence. The 
misconduct of all three was certainly objectively highly offensive. Most people 
would likely agree that flagrant abuses such as those committed by Bill Clinton, 
Father Nutt, and Selvaggio should be extirpated from the workplace.
2. Unwelcome Words or Conduct
The EEOC should not have to prove that sexual words or conduct were 
unwelcome. Whether a plaintiff experienced misconduct as unwelcome is and 
should be a material consideration when a victim of harassment seeks 
compensation in a federal lawsuit. If, without coercion or fear of reprisal, a 
person voluntarily consented to sexual activity or conduct, she has no reasonable 
basis for recovery. Put another way, if the words or conduct were welcome, the 
plaintiff was not harmed. But in an EEOC enforcement proceeding, an 
individual would not seek compensation, nor would the EEOC seek 
compensation on her behalf. Proving injury—an element of virtually any claim 
for individual recovery—would be superfluous.380 The goal of an EEOC 
proceeding would be to identify and eliminate words or conduct that violate a
rigorous but not unreasonable objective standard of decency. Eliminating the 
“unwelcome” requirement would prevent outcomes similar to the decision in 
Blake v. MJ Optical, Inc.,381 where the Eighth Circuit denied Blake’s claim 
because she did not object to the pattern of harassment that the owner’s son 
inflicted on her.382
3. The Discrimination Requirement
As long as sexual harassment falls under the umbrella of discrimination, 
differential treatment based on gender will be an element of a violation. 
Sometimes, highly offensive sexual behavior may not fit neatly into the category 
of sex discrimination, and therefore the requirement of differential treatment 
may excuse instances of highly offensive sexual behavior in the workplace. 
                                                                                                                     
380 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34 (discussing the universality of the injury 
requirement for those seeking a judicial remedy).
381 Blake v. MJ Optical, Inc., 870 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 2017).
382 Id. at 823 (detailing a protracted pattern of harassing words and conduct, including 
grabbing the victim’s behind on multiple occasions and joking about her breasts).
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Suppose, for example, the CEO, at a company picnic, addressed the entire 
workforce, male and female. During his talk, the CEO exposed and fondled
himself. One might persuasively argue that, because both sexes endured this 
behavior, it was nondiscriminatory. This episode might be characterized as 
“nondiscriminatory” sexual harassment, which falls outside the proscription of 
Title VII. Nevertheless, the EEOC should apply the discrimination element 
sensibly. It should reject the Sixth Circuit’s view, expressed in Graves v. Dayton 
Gastroenterology, Inc.,383 where the court ruled sexually explicit texts and a 
subsequent pattern of retaliation, nondiscriminatory.384 As Judge Nelson Moore 
observed, a finder of fact might reasonably have regarded the texts and 
retaliation as manifestations “of sexual desire and rejection.”385
4. Subjective Perception
Harris requires that a plaintiff prove that she perceived the harassment as 
altering her work environment.386 This requirement, too, has no place in an 
EEOC enforcement proceeding. Just as a party’s “unwelcome” reaction has no 
bearing on whether the harasser’s words or conduct were unacceptable from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the workplace, any individual’s subjective 
reaction would similarly be irrelevant. The material factor in an EEOC 
proceeding is how a reasonable person would have perceived the harassment. 
5. Pollution of the Work Environment
Although the Supreme Court has stated that “pollution” of the work 
environment is not an element of a hostile work environment claim,387 some 
courts have imposed that standard.388 The EEOC, in enforcement proceedings, 
should not have to prove that highly offensive sexual words or conduct polluted 
or even altered the conditions of employment. The purpose of reframing the 
elements of hostile-work-environment harassment is to excise sexual 
harassment from the workplace. Replacing the “severe or pervasive” standard 
with the “highly offensive” standard would facilitate the efforts of the EEOC to 
reach this goal. Retaining the requirement that the harassment pollute or even 
alter the work environment would be retrogressive because it would allow the 
“severe or pervasive” element of the current sexual harassment approach to 
reenter the analysis through the backdoor.
                                                                                                                     
383 Graves v. Dayton Gastroenterology, Inc., 657 Fed. Appx. 485, 486 (6th Cir. 2016).
384 Id. at 487–89.
385 Id. at 491 (Nelson Moore, J., dissenting).
386 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (requiring both an objective and 
subjective component for a sexual harassment claim).
387 See id. (remarking that, although Taylor’s gross misconduct in Meritor “polluted” 
Vinson’s work environment, such “egregious examples of harassment . . . do not mark the 
boundary of what is actionable”).
388 See supra Part III.D.
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6. Repudiation of Vance
As discussed in Part II.E.2, Vance minimized the deterrent effect of Ellerth
by adopting a narrow definition of “supervisor.”389 Congress should empower 
the EEOC to use the inclusive definition of “supervisor” in enforcement 
proceedings. By defining a supervisor as someone with the authority to effect 
the terms or conditions of a victim’s employment, rather than as someone with 
the authority to take tangible employment actions against the victim, Congress 
would permit the Ellerth affirmative defense to exert its full deterrent impact.
V. CONCLUSION
Most deplore sexual harassment, yet few do anything about it. True, some 
employers have taken remedial action. Whether motivated by ethics or fear of 
liability, many employers have adopted, communicated, and enforced sexual 
harassment policies that conform to the guidance of the EEOC.390 Some 
employers require their workers to complete training protocols. These policies 
and programs have largely failed to reduce the incidence of harassment because 
they have focused on the avoidance of liability rather than on cultivating 
sensitivity toward the plight of victims and developing a corporate culture that 
promotes empathy and instills in bystanders a duty to report.391
A staggering number of women, and a substantial number of men, face 
indignities, ridicule, and molestation.392 Reluctant to report offensive conduct, 
they fear embarrassment, blame, retaliation, and censure.393 Like witnesses to a 
drowning person, colleagues stand idly by and watch the beleaguered founder.
The law cannot grab the indifferent by the throat to awaken them to the 
depth and breadth of a crisis that plagues the American workplace. Neither a 
congressional statute, an administrative regulation, nor a Supreme Court 
decision can supplant apathy with virtue. Nevertheless, the law may serve a 
salutary role. Meritor and Harris established the elements of a hostile-work-
environment claim. To have such a claim, a victim must prove discriminatory 
unwelcome words or conduct of a sexual or gender-related nature that 
                                                                                                                     
389 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
390 Policy Guidance Documents Related to Sexual Harassment, EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (June 21, 1999),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html [https://perma.cc/UMJ6-4Q8J] (“An 
effective preventive program should include an explicit policy against sexual harassment that 
is clearly and regularly communicated to employees and effectively implemented.”).
391 See EEOC REPORT, supra note 1, at 52–60 (promoting workplace “civility training” 
and “bystander training” that shift focus away from the legal requirements of harassment and 
concentrate instead on respect for co-workers and ethical and corporate cultural 
responsibilities to report sexual misconduct).
392 See Romeo Vitelli, When Men Face Sexual Harassment, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 11, 
2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/media-spotlight/201505/when-men-face-
sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/VE5H-ELZA].
393 See EEOC REPORT, supra note 1, at v. 
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subjectively and objectively rendered the work environment hostile.394 This 
standard, though suitable for claims seeking compensation for victims,
implicitly condones unacceptable behavior. To address this inadequacy in the 
law, Congress should authorize the EEOC to institute enforcement proceedings 
to sanction irresponsible employers. In such proceedings the EEOC should have 
to prove only that a reasonable person would have found a harasser’s
discriminatory misconduct highly offensive. To strengthen the deterrent effect 
of the Ellerth affirmative defense, the EEOC should apply a broad definition of 
“supervisor.”395 This definition would cover any worker with authority to direct 
the work activities of a co-worker.
Expanded EEOC oversight and the heightened prospect of detection and 
sanctions would boost the deterrent impact of Title VII. Disclosing the results 
of EEOC enforcement proceedings might cause defendants reputational injury.
Public disapprobation would spur employers to shed complacency and take a 
more vigorous stance in opposing sexual harassment. The proposal in this 
Article would not eradicate the pandemic, but if enhanced EEOC oversight and 
enforcement decreased the incidence of sexual harassment by only a few 
percent, thousands of women and men in the workplace would receive a 
priceless gift.
                                                                                                                     
394 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
395 State legislatures would help curtail sexual harassment by enacting into state law the 
measures proposed in this Article.
